In Estate of Collias (1951) 37 Cal.2d 587, Chris Collias died testate. His will, that named his nephew Argirios Collias as executor, provided: "'All the rest and residue of my estate, of every kind and description, and wherever situated, I give, devise and bequeath unto my nephew Argirios Collias a resident of Long Beach, California at the time this instrument is signed. It is my desire and wish that my nephew Argirios Collias will give half of my estate to my nearest relative heir in Greece instructing him or her to distribute said half of my estate in equal shares to all my close relatives in Greece. In the event that my said nephew Argirios Collias shall predecease me, then said estate shall go and it is hereby bequeathed to my nearest relative in Greece to be distributed as above among the other relatives.'" ( Id. at p. 588.) After paying all debts and expenses, the estate was distributed to Argirios without qualification. On appeal, the nephews and nieces of the decedent argued that the decree erroneously vested absolute title in Argirios, and the proper construction of the will is that one-half of the estate is left to him in trust for the use and benefit of the nearest or close relatives of the decedent in Greece. Our Supreme Court disagreed, stating: "To impose a trust upon property bequeathed and devised to Argirios, it must appear that the testator intended to impose mandatory duties upon him. Otherwise stated, where an absolute estate has been conveyed by a will, that estate will not be limited by subsequent words unless they indicate as clear an intention therefor as was shown by the words creating the estate. Thus it is provided in section 104 of the Probate Code that 'A clear and distinct devise or bequest cannot be affected by any reasons assigned therefor, or by any other words not equally clear and distinct, or by inference or argument from other parts of the will, or by an inaccurate recital of or reference to its contents in another part of the will.' "It is clear that the sentence 'All the rest and residue of my estate . . . I give, devise and bequeath unto my nephew. . . .' standing alone, would bequeath the property to Argirios absolutely. The only question presented for decision is whether by the sentence following the words: 'It is my desire and wish . . .' the testator intended to impose a legally enforceable duty or a mere moral obligation. "'"Prima facie, a mere request, or an expression of hope or confidence or expectation, does not import a command." . . . According to the ordinary use of the English language, the word, "desire" does not import a trust or charge. . . .' In Estate of Marti (1901) 132 Cal. 666, 672, it was said . . . that 'Words which merely raise a doubt or suggest an inference will not affect the estate thus conveyed, and any doubt which may be suggested by reason of such subsequent words must be resolved in favor of the estate first conveyed.' " ( Estate of Collias, supra, 37 Cal.2d 587, 589.) With the above in mind, the Collias court found it clear that, standing alone, the sentence "'All the rest and residue of my estate . . . I give, devise and bequeath unto my nephew. . . .'" would give such property to Argirios absolutely. ( Estate of Collias, supra, 37 Cal.2d 587, 589.) The Supreme Court stated the question before it was whether, by the sentence immediately following the above-discussed sentence, the testator intended to impose a legally enforceable duty or a mere moral obligation. (Ibid.) According to our Supreme Court, the mere request or expression of hope or confidence or expectation does not import a command. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court then discussed the guidelines for the determination of the intent of the testator. "As a guide to the determination of the intent of the testator, the courts have stated certain general principles. Thus in Estate of Lawrence(1941) 17 Cal.2d 1, 7 . . ., it was said that '. . . when words of recommendation, request and the like are used in direct reference to the estate, they are prima facie testamentary and imperative, and not precatory. While the desire of a testator for the disposal of his estate is a mere request when addressed to his devisee, it is to be construed as a command when addressed to his executor.' And . . . 'A wish or request of the testator for the disposition of his estate directed to the executor is a command, but if addressed to the legatee it will not be construed as a limitation on the estate given in absolute terms. '" ( Estate of Collias, supra, 37 Cal.2d 587, 589-590.)