In Freeman v. City of Beverly Hills (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 892, on June 25, 1987, the city issued a building permit to modify a restaurant into a "drive-in" business. (Freeman, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 892.) On July 8, 1987, the city suspended the permit on the ground it had been erroneously issued in violation of a municipal ordinance requiring approval from the architectural commission before issuance of permits. (Id. at pp. 894-895.) On July 21, 1987, two weeks after suspending the permit, the city adopted an interim ordinance establishing a CUP procedure for drive-in facilities, and extended the ordinance by a second interim ordinance on September 1, 1987. (Id. at p. 895.) The restaurant owners submitted plans to the architectural commission which approved them on September 10, 1987, subject to four conditions, one of which prohibited drive-in use. The owners did not seek review of the September 10, 1987 decision and complied with the conditions. On July 5, 1988, the city again extended the interim ordinance. On April 24, 1989, the owners filed a complaint against the city seeking damages and declaratory relief on the theory the CUP was adopted and extended in violation of the city's own ordinances and that the owners had acquired a vested right to operate a drive-in facility prior to the adoption of the interim ordinance. Freeman affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the city on the ground the action was time barred by section 65009, subdivision (c)(2), which then provided in relevant part: "No action or proceeding shall be maintained in any of the following cases by any person unless the action or proceeding is commenced and service is made on the legislative body within 120 days after the legislative body's decision . . . ." (Freeman, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 896.) A 1995 amendment to section 65009, subdivision (c), substituted "90 days" for "120 days." (36C West's Ann. Gov. Code (1997 ed.) Hist. & Statutory Notes foll. 65009, p. 360.) Freeman explained: "The Legislature intended to foreclose any and all challenges to the validity of zoning ordinances unless they were filed promptly. Thus, it used very broad language in defining the kinds of challenges which had to be made within 120 days. This language is clearly broad enough to encompass claims for monetary damages which are based on a legislative body's decision to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance. A lawsuit seeking monetary damages on this basis is both an 'attack' on the decision and an attempt to obtain a judicial 'review' of that decision. Accordingly, we hold monetary damage claims of this type are barred by . . . section 65009, subdivision (c)(2) unless brought within the 120-day limitation period. Appellants did not bring their lawsuit within that period and therefore the suit, including the monetary claims, is time-barred." (Freeman, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 897.) The key issue in Freeman was whether section 65009, subdivision (c)(2) covers monetary damage claims. (Freeman, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 897, fn. 2.) Although Freeman did not specifically discuss the applicability of section 65009 outside the "housing" context, inherent in the decision is that section 65009 is not limited to "housing" -- if section 65009 were so limited, the restaurant owners' action against the city would not have been barred by the statute. In sum, in Freeman v. City of Beverly Hills (1994) the city issued a building permit allowing the landowner to modify his restaurant to conduct a drive-in business and make the restrooms accessible for the disabled. After remodeling commenced, the city claimed the building permit had been issued in error and issued a stop work order. The city explained architectural commission approval should have been obtained before the permit issued. Shortly thereafter, the city enacted an emergency ordinance requiring a conditional use permit (CUP) procedure for drive-in facilities in the city. When the landowner applied for the CUP, the architectural commission imposed a condition prohibiting drive-in use. The landowner did not challenge the architectural commission's decision, but proceeded to complete the remodeling in accordance with the CUP issued. (Id. at p. 896.) After completion, the landowner sued the city for declaratory relief and money damages for inverse condemnation. Freeman upheld summary judgment in the city's favor because suit was not timely under section 65009, subdivision (c)(2). That provision required filing an action within 120 days if sought to "'to attack, review, set aside, void or annul the decision of a legislative body to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance.'" The court reasoned that money damages based on a legislative body's decision constituted "both an 'attack' on the decision and an attempt to obtain a judicial 'review' of that decision." (Freeman, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 897.)