In Gin v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 939, the court held that carpal tunnel syndrome which developed from the repetitive trauma of typing at a computer keyboard did not constitute an " 'accidental bodily injury' " as required for benefits under a disability policy. (Id. at pp. 940.) Gin quoted with approval from the Supreme Court's decision in Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 558, 564, that " 'a series of imperceptible events that finally culminated in a single tangible harm' " does not constitute an accident. (Gin, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 945.) Gin also relied, inter alia, on Khatchatrian v. Continental Cas. Co. (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 1227, 1228, which held that "where stroke was caused by insured's chronic high blood pressure, injury from stroke was not an 'accident' under the Geddes & Smith analysis." (Gin, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 944-945.) The Gin court reasoned: "Typing at a keyboard was an activity in which Gin normally engaged. It did not become an 'accident' merely because the cumulative effect of a long period of typing was the onset of carpal tunnel syndrome. (See Williams v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 229, 234-235, jogging was not an activity that could be characterized as 'accident' even though it may have set in motion events leading to injury; Alessandro v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 203, 210 no evidence of accidental occurrence where 'injury was the end result of a long existing degenerative disease'.) Because Gin's disability was not the result of 'accidental bodily injury' as that term is understood in California law, it falls outside of the coverage of the policy." (Gin v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 945.)