In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 757, Ford attempted to introduce a statistical study from an accident database maintained by the State of Washington to show that, proportionately, Pinto cars produced no greater chance of injury or death from fire than other vehicles. The trial court excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352, noting the study encompassed only a small number of collisions resulting in Pinto fires, "thus rendering the sampling open to misleading inferences." (119 Cal.App.3d at p. 792.) The court also found the study's reliability questionable. (Ibid.) The appellate court found no abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) The defect at issue was the Ford Pinto's gas tank. Ford requested that the court instruct the jury that, in considering whether the gas tank was defective, it was to consider " 'the extent to which its (Pinto's) design and manufacture matched the average quality of other automobiles and the extent to which its design and manufacture deviated from the norm for automobiles designed and manufactured at the same point in time.' " ( Id. at p. 803.) The Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly refused the instruction as improper evidence of industry custom or practice. (Ibid.) The Court evaluated the evidence, including circumstantial evidence, and found the plaintiff had made a substantial showing "that Ford's management decided to proceed with the production of the Pinto with knowledge of test results revealing design defects which rendered the fuel tank extremely vulnerable on rear impact at low speeds and endangered the safety and lives of the occupants. Such conduct constitutes corporate malice." (Id. at p. 814.) Likewise, the court referred to Ford's cost-benefit decisions, "balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits," as showing Ford's "institutional mentality" as "one of callous indifference to public safety," justifying a punitive damages award based on corporate conduct constituting "conscious disregard" of the probability of injury to members of the consuming public. (Id. at p. 813.) In sum, in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) the court considered a case in which the cross-appellant consented to a remittitur after the trial court conditionally granted a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. The court explained the legal standard as follows: "In ruling on a motion for new trial for excessive damages, the trial court does not sit 'in an appellate capacity but as an independent trier of fact.' This role as a fact finder is conferred on the trial court by Code of Civil Procedure section 662.5 which provides that if a new trial limited to the issue of damages would be proper after a jury trial, 'the trial court may in its discretion: . . . (b) if the ground for granting a new trial is excessive damages, make its order granting the new trial subject to the condition that the motion for a new trial is denied if the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered consents to a reduction of so much thereof as the court in its independent judgment determines from the evidence to be fair and reasonable.' (Italics supplied.) In addition, Code of Civil Procedure section 657 provides that an order granting a new trial for excessive damages shall be reversed 'only if there is no substantial basis in the record for' the reasons stated in the judge's specification of reasons. An appellate court may reverse the order granting the new trial only when the reasons given by the trial judge reflect a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion. " (Id. at p. 823.) Section 662.5 has since been amended; the pertinent portion, subdivision (a)(2), now provides that in a civil action where an order granting a new trial on the issue of damages would be proper, the trial court may, in its discretion, "if the ground for granting a new trial is excessive damages, issue a conditional order granting the new trial unless the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered consents to the reduction of so much thereof as the court in its independent judgment determines from the evidence to be fair and reasonable."