In In re Kowalski (1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 67, 70 98 Cal. Rptr. 444, one trial court judge improperly purported to exercise appellate jurisdiction over another. After a mistrial was declared, the trial court (Judge Fisher) granted a motion under Penal Code section 995 and dismissed the matter. (21 Cal. App. 3d at p. 69.) The People did not appeal the dismissal order. ( Id. at p. 71.) Following the dismissal, the parties somehow were before the trial court, before a different judge, Judge Low, who stated Judge Fisher had acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting the dismissal motion. Judge Low vacated the dismissal and ordered a new trial date. ( Id. at pp. 69-70.) The defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal, contending the dismissal order ended further proceedings in the trial court, and therefore Judge Low's order purporting to vacate the dismissal and to set a new trial date was void. ( In re Kowalski, supra, 21 Cal. App. 3d at p. 70.) In re Kowalski granted the petition, ruling Judge Fisher's dismissal order was binding and should have been followed by the superior court until such time as that order was overturned. ( Id. at p. 71.) The People could have appealed the dismissal order, but instead, they "bypassed orderly procedures for review" (ibid.) by having Judge Low vacate the dismissal. In sum, the defect in In re Kowalski was that one trial court judge purported to exercise appellate jurisdiction over another. In In re Kowalski (1971) the defendant's pretrial motion to set aside the indictment under Penal Code section 995 was denied. At trial, before a different judge, a mistrial was declared, and the defendant was invited by the court to renew his section 995 motion. The motion was granted, and the case dismissed. The defendant was then brought before the original judge, who, stating the trial judge had acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting the motion, ordered a new trial.(21 Cal.app.3d at pp. 69-70.) The appellate court held that even though the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing renewal of the motion, it was within the judge's jurisdiction to do so. The first judge had no jurisdiction to act after that "'"A superior court is but one tribunal, even if it be composed of numerous departments. . . . An order made in one department during the progress of a cause can neither be ignored nor overlooked in another department . . . ."'" ( Id. at p. 70.) The prosecution's remedy was to appeal the trial judge's order of dismissal. ( Id. at p. 71.)