In Merrick v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 212, a movie producer (Merrick) sued a writer's guild (the Guild), alleging claims that included malicious prosecution and abuse of process. (Id. at p. 215.) Merrick's causes of action were premised on the allegation that the Guild had improperly brought to arbitration a claim that Merrick had breached an agreement to compensate two of the Guild's members. (Ibid.) The Guild filed a petition to compel arbitration on the ground that Merrick's tort claims were subject to arbitration. The arbitration agreement at issue provided for the arbitration of "Any dispute . . . concerning the interpretation of any of the terms of this Basic Agreement and the application and effect of such terms as determined by an interpretation thereof . . . ." (Id. at p. 217.) The Merrick court quoted the arbitration provision, as follows: "Article 10 (entitled 'Grievance and Arbitration') provides in part: 'A. Matters Subject to Grievance and Arbitration (General) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Article or elsewhere in this Basic Agreement, the following matters shall be submitted to grievance and thereafter to arbitration as hereinafter provided, and no other matters shall be submitted to grievance or arbitration: 1. Any dispute between the Guild and the Company concerning the interpretation of any of the terms of this Basic Agreement and the application and effect of such terms as determined by an interpretation thereof. . . . C. Matters Subject to Arbitration but not Grievance Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in this Article 10, the following matters shall be submitted to arbitration but not to grievance: 1. Any dispute as to whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction or whether any matter is arbitrable, provided however, that the arbitrator may not order an arbitration of any matter not arbitrable as provided above. . . .' Article 12 (entitled Court Proceedings) provides in pertinent part: 'C. Nothing in this Basic Agreement shall impair, affect or limit the right of the Company, the Guild or any writer to assert and exercise any and all appropriate legal or equitable rights or remedies to which such Company, Guild or writer is entitled in any court of competent jurisdiction as to any dispute which is not subject to grievance or arbitration pursuant to this Basic Agreement. . . .'" (Id. at pp. 217-218.) In concluding that the claims fell within the scope of the arbitration provision, the Merrick court reasoned in part: "The trial court denied the petition to compel arbitration on the ground that inasmuch as Merrick's claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process arise out of tort, not contract, they are outside the scope of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. However, a complaint sounding in tort will not in itself prevent arbitration if the underlying agreement embraces the disputed matter. Merrick's complaint does not assert claims which are wholly independent of the arbitration provisions of the basic agreement. On the contrary, the alleged basis of his tort action is that the Guild acted maliciously and for the purpose of inflicting harm upon Merrick in having prosecuted arbitration proceedings against him pursuant to the agreement. Inasmuch as the Guild's allegedly tortious conduct occurred in connection with arbitration proceedings, it cannot be said that the dispute engendered by that conduct is outside the scope of the arbitration provisions simply because Merrick, by his complaint, makes it the basis of causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Stated another way, the present action has its roots in the relationship between the parties which was created by the collective bargaining provisions of their agreement. Accordingly, the fact that Merrick's action sounds in tort rather than contract is not a valid basis for the order denying the Guild's petition to compel arbitration." (Id. at pp. 219-220.) In Merrick, the arbitration clause was restricted to disputes "concerning the interpretation of any of the terms of an agreement and the application and effect of such terms as determined by an interpretation thereof . . . ." (Merrick, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 217.)