In People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, the defendant was charged with petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction pursuant to section 666. The trial court denied his request to stipulate to the prior conviction to preclude the jury from learning about his felony robbery prior conviction. The trial court permitted the prosecution to prove the prior conviction in open court based on its assumption that the prior conviction was an element of the offense. (Id. at p. 470.) The jury convicted the defendant of the section 666 charge, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "the prior conviction and incarceration requirement of section 666 is a sentencing factor for the trial court and not an 'element' of a section 666 'offense' that must be determined by a jury" (Bouzas, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 480.) In addition to an analysis of the case law, the court noted that "section 666 is--and has been since 1872--part of title 16 of the Penal Code, which is directed primarily to sentencing and punishment matters, to the exclusion of statutes defining substantive crimes. This supports our conclusion that the Legislature has long intended that section 666 establishes a penalty, not a substantive 'offense.' The language of section 666 affirms this view. It is structured to enhance the punishment for violation of other defined crimes and not to define an offense in the first instance. It simply refers to other substantive offenses defined elsewhere in the Penal and Vehicle Codes and provides that if a defendant has previously been convicted of and imprisoned for any of these theft-related offenses, and thereafter commits petty theft (defined in section 484), the defendant is subject to punishment enhanced over that which would apply following a 'first time' petty theft conviction. In other words, a charge under section 666 merely puts a defendant on notice . . . that if he is convicted of the substantive offense and if the prior conviction and incarceration allegation of section 666 is admitted or found true, he faces enhanced punishment at the time of sentencing. We conclude that, on its face, section 666 is a sentence-enhancing statute, not a substantive 'offense' statute." (Bouzas, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 478-479.) Accordingly, the defendant "had a right to stipulate to the prior conviction and incarceration and thereby preclude the jury from learning of the fact of his prior conviction." (Id. at p. 480.)