In People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, the defendant contended a predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 852 (the 1999 revised version of CALJIC No. 2.50.02) violated his right to due process because it allowed the jury to find "him guilty under a standard that was less than beyond a reasonable doubt." (Brown, at p. 1335.) CALJIC No. 2.50.02 allowed the jury to find (by a preponderance of the evidence) that the defendant committed a prior domestic violence offense, and to infer there from that the defendant was "'likely to commit and did commit the crimes charged against him,'" but warned the jury such finding was "'not sufficient by itself to prove that he committed the charged offenses.'" (Brown, at p. 1334.) Brown held CALJIC No. 2.50.02 "did not allow the jury to infer that [the defendant] committed the charged crime solely from proof that he committed the prior acts of domestic violence." (Brown, at p. 1335.) The Court rejected a claim of instructional error that was virtually identical to appellant's claim herein. Brown involved a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon and false imprisonment arising out of the defendant's violent assault on his girlfriend. The trial court admitted section 1109 evidence of prior domestic violence toward two other girlfriends, which predated the charged offenses. ( Id. at pp. 1331-1332.) The trial court instructed the jury under the 1999 revision of CALJIC No. 2.50.02, that if it found the defendant had committed the prior, uncharged offenses, it could infer that he had a disposition to commit offenses involving domestic violence. ( Id. at p. 1332.) CALJIC No. 2.50.02 also instructed that if the jury found such predisposition, the jury was allowed to infer that the defendant was likely to commit and did commit the crimes with which he was currently charged. (Ibid.) The jury was also instructed under CALJIC No. 2.50.1, that the prosecution only had to prove the uncharged offenses by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.) On appeal from his conviction of numerous crimes resulting from his assault on his girlfriend, defendant claimed the jury instructions were confusing and allowed the jury to convict him of the currently charged offenses based on evidence of a prior offense of domestic violence, without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the current offenses. ( People v. Brown, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1328, 1332, 1334 .) Specifically, he claimed the court's giving of CALJIC No. 2.50.1, in combination with the giving of CALJIC No. 2.50.02, constituted instructional error because it reduced the prosecution's burden of proof to a standard (preponderance of the evidence) below that which due process permits. ( Id. at p. 1332.) Brown rejected these contentions and held CALJIC Nos. 2.50.1 and 2.50.02 did not allow the jury to infer that defendant committed the charged crimes solely from proof that he committed the prior acts of domestic violence. ( People v. Brown, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335.) Brown explained that "the instructions expressly provided that 'evidence that the defendant committed prior offenses involving domestic violence is not sufficient by itself to prove that he committed the charged offenses,'" and "this language essentially tracks the 1999 revised version of CALJIC No. 2.50.02 ...." (Ibid.) Brown relied on the Supreme Court's dictum in People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 924, indicating that the 1999 revised version of CALJIC No. 2.50.02 (the same instruction at issue in the instant appeal) "'adequately sets forth the controlling principles' for the jury's use of other crimes evidence." ( People v. Brown, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335.) Brown concluded there was no reasonable likelihood the jury believed it could convict the defendant based on the lower standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence because "a review of the record revealed a consistent message from the instructions as a whole and from the closing arguments ... that ... the jury must find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it could convict him of any of the charged offenses." (Ibid.) In sum, the court rejected a due process challenge to an instruction under CALJIC 2.50.02, which is identical to CALJIC No. 2.50.01 with the exception that it instructs the jury regarding its consideration of past acts of domestic violence, not sex crimes. The court rejected the defense argument that the instruction given allowed "the jury to infer that he committed the charged crime solely from proof that he committed the prior acts of domestic violence. To the contrary, the instructions expressly provided that 'evidence that the defendant committed prior offenses involving domestic violence is not sufficient by itself to prove that he committed the charged offenses.'" (Brown, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335.) Noting the California Supreme Court's approval of this language in Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th 903, the court concluded that there was "no reasonable likelihood" that the jury believed that it could convict the defendant solely based upon past acts of domestic violence. ( Brown, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335.)