People v. Dial

In People v. Dial (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 657, the defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property, a crime not enumerated in former section 296, subdivision (a)(1). He contended on appeal that the court ordered him to comply with the DNA Act, as amended by Proposition 69, in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable government intrusion. The defendant requested "that the 'order' requiring DNA samples 'be rescinded and that any information that may have been obtained as a result of this order be both suppressed and destroyed.' " (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 660.) The court did not reach the merits, concluding the defendant's constitutional challenge could not be reached or effectively remedied on appeal. (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 660.) The court noted the defendant's challenge did not affect the judgment of conviction, as was the case in other appeals that reached the merits of constitutional challenges to the DNA Act. For instance, in People v. Adams (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 243, the defendant, who was convicted of first degree murder with rape and sodomy special circumstances, moved at trial to suppress blood evidence taken when he was in prison for inclusion in the state's convicted offender DNA database. The court considered and rejected the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge to the DNA Act. (Id. at pp. 255-259; see also People v. King (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1363.) The defendant claimed a sentencing court's "order" pursuant to Penal Code section 296 requiring the de-fendant to provide DNA samples violated his Fourth Amendment rights (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659-660); therefore, the defendant asked the appellate court that the "order" "'be rescinded and that any in-formation that may have been obtained as a result of this order be both suppressed and destroyed.'" (Id. at p. 660.) Dial concluded the claim was not cognizable on appeal. (Id. at p. 659.) The Dial case involved a defendant convicted of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)) and whose probation was revoked in another case based on the same conduct. Dial claimed that at sentencing, the trial court ordered him to submit DNA samples in violation of his Fourth Amendment right "to be free of unreasonable governmental intrusion.' " (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 660.) Dial requested this relevant relief: "an 'order' requiring DNA samples 'be rescinded.' " (Id. at p. 661.) Dial also requested this relief: " 'That any information that may have been obtained as a result of this order be both suppressed and destroyed' (italics added)." (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 661.) The Dial court found there was no need to reach the merits of defendant's challenge as to this requested relief, because "not one of the authorities or officials who are charged with administrating the DNA Act is a party to this action so that we or the trial court could grant injunctive relief if persuaded by Dial's Fourth Amendment Claims." (Ibid.) The Dial court did not rule on the People's claim that the appeal was premature in that the record does not show whether Dial "will be or has been required to submit DNA samples." (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 660.) Rather, the Dial court simply proceeded in the abstract based on a hypothetical "order" directing Dial to submit DNA samples. (Ibid.) It was under these circumstances that the Dial court stated there was "no need to reach the merits of Dial's challenge" as to his requested relief to have rescinded a DNA sampling order. (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 662.) The court reasoned in pertinent part: Such an "order" was "more akin to an advisement" and the DNA Act's "requirements that specified persons give DNA samples are, to use the People's term, 'self-executing' in that they are mandatory and arise with or without a trial court advisement or order to that effect." (Id. at pp. 661-662.) In sum, appellant was asking for relief in the nature of a mandatory injunction, asking the appellate court to enter an "order" requiring DNA samples "'be rescinded and that any information that may have been ob-tained as a result of this order be both suppressed and destroyed.'" (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 660.) The trial court in Dial did not feel the need to reach the appellant's argument that any DNA evidence be sup-pressed and the results destroyed in that the record does not show whether Dial "will be or has been re-quired to submit DNA samples." (Ibid.) It was in this context that the Dial court determined there was "no need to reach the merits of Dial's chal-lenge" as to his requested relief to have rescinded a DNA sampling order. (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 662.) The Dial case involved a defendant convicted of receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)) and whose pro-bation was revoked in another case based on the same conduct. Dial claimed that at sentencing, the trial court ordered him to submit DNA samples in violation of his Fourth Amendment right "'to be free of unrea-sonable governmental intrusion.'" (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 660.) Dial requested this relevant relief: "an 'order' requiring DNA samples 'be rescinded.'" (Id. at p. 661.) Dial also requested this relief: "'That any information that may have been obtained as a result of this order be both suppressed and destroyed'." (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 661.) The Dial court found there was no need to reach the merits of defendant's challenge as to this requested relief, because "not one of the authorities or officials who are charged with administrating the DNA Act is a party to this action so that we or the trial court could grant injunctive relief if persuaded by Dial's Fourth Amendment claims." (Ibid.) It was under these circumstances that the Dial court stated there was "no need to reach the merits of Dial's challenge" as to his requested relief to have rescinded a DNA sampling order. (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 662.) The court reasoned in pertinent part: Such an "order" was "more akin to an advisement" and the DNA Act's "requirements that specified persons give DNA samples are, to use the People's term, 'self-executing' in that they are mandatory and arise with or without a trial court advisement or order to that effect." (Id. at pp. 661-662, italics added.) The Dial court's reasoning is not persuasive. Initially, we point out that the court was not confronted by an actual order that Dial submit DNA samples. The Dial court never determined whether Dial "will be or has been required to submit DNA samples" and proceeded solely based on a hypothetical "'order.'" (Dial, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 660-661.)