In People v. Douglas (1999) 20 Cal.4th 85, the defendant was charged in the first count with obtaining over $ 400 in health care benefits by false declaration and in the second count with grand theft from the State of California. ( Id. at p. 88.) The defendant pleaded no contest to both charges, based on the trial court's representation that it would treat both offenses as misdemeanors and place him on three years' probation. (Ibid.) The People objected to treating the first count as a wobbler, asserting that it was a straight felony. (Ibid.) However, critical to our analysis, the People did not also object to the grant of probation. (Ibid.) The defendant pleaded no contest to two charged felonies based upon the court's representation that both of the offenses would be treated as misdemeanors and he would be placed on probation. ( Id. at p. 88.) The People objected to treating one of the offenses as a misdemeanor, but did not object to the grant of probation. (Ibid.) The court, immediately after the defendant's plea, suspended imposition of judgment and ordered the defendant placed on probation for three years, with stated conditions. ( Id. at pp. 88-89.) The People appealed, challenging the court's treatment of one charge as a misdemeanor. The California Supreme Court concluded that an appeal was authorized under another subdivision of section 1238 (discussed, post). However, the court also held that the order was not appealable under section 1238, subdivision (a)(10) because "no sentence was imposed" in that case; rather, probation was granted. ( People v. Douglas, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 92, fn. 7.) The majority held the People were authorized under section 1238, subdivision (a)(5) (which permits the prosecution to appeal from postjudgment orders) to appeal from the trial court's section 17(b)(3) order reducing a charge to a misdemeanor. (Douglas, at p. 88.) The majority concluded the People's appeal was not barred by section 1238, subdivision (d) (which permits the prosecution only to petition for writ relief from a probation grant) (Douglas, at p. 94) in part because the trial court reduced the charge to a misdemeanor after it granted probation (Douglas, at pp. 88, 91). In Justice Kennard's dissent, she argued, "It is only by writ of mandate, and not by appeal, that the People can seek review of a trial court's section 17(b)(3) declaration at the initial sentencing hearing reducing a felony to a misdemeanor." (Douglas, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 99 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) In her "view, when a court declares a wobbler to be a misdemeanor at any time during the same sentencing hearing at which the court grants probation, the declaration occurs 'at the time of granting probation' for purposes of section 17(b)(3), and it is thus a part of the court's probationary order from which the People can seek review only by petition for writ of mandate citation." (Id. at p. 97 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Within this context, Justice Kennard stated that a section 17(b)(3) declaration "is part of the trial court's disposition of the case that is indivisible from the court's suspension of imposition of sentence and grant of probation." (Douglas, at p. 99 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)