In People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1131, the California Supreme Court further instructed that "reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground." ( People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1129; see also this court's decision in People v. Tinajero (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1551.) "Instruction on an unsupported theory is prejudicial only if that theory became the sole basis of the verdict of guilt; if the jury based its verdict on the valid ground, or on both the valid and the invalid ground, there would be no prejudice, for there would be a valid basis for the verdict." ( People v. Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) "In determining whether there was prejudice, the entire record should be examined, including the facts and the instructions, the arguments of counsel, any communications from the jury during deliberations, and the entire verdict." (Ibid.) 4. In People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, the court "distinguished between two types of cases involving insufficient evidence: (a) those in which 'a particular theory of conviction . . . is contrary to law,' or, phrased slightly differently, cases involving a 'legally inadequate theory'; and (b) those in which the jury has merely been 'left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory,' or, also phrased slightly differently, cases in which there was an 'insufficiency of proof.'" ( Id. at p. 1128, italics in original, quoting Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46.) The Guiton court explained: "If the inadequacy of proof is purely factual, of a kind the jury is fully equipped to detect, reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground. But if the inadequacy is legal, not merely factual, that is, when the facts do not state a crime under the applicable statute, as in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, the Green rule requiring reversal applies, absent a basis in the record to find that the verdict was actually based on a valid ground." ( Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) In Guiton, the court concluded that when the only error is the trial court's reading of an "instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case, " it is "one of state law subject to the traditional Watson test ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 applicable to such error." ( Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1129-1130.) The court further held that "the appellate court should affirm the judgment unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory." ( Id. at p. 1130.) In Guiton, the prosecutor "briefly argued to the jury" that the defendant was guilty based on a factually inadequate theory (that he was guilty of selling cocaine), but "concentrated on" a factually adequate theory (that the defendant was guilty of transporting cocaine). The court relied on this fact to conclude that "the record does not affirmatively demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury found the defendant guilty solely on the sale theory." ( Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1131.) The court noted that the jury was instructed to convict the defendant of a felony if it found he either sold or transported cocaine, but that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that he sold cocaine. The court found that the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant sold cocaine to be a purely factual question, and the Griffin rule generally requiring affirmance applied. (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1131.) The California Supreme Court noted that the jury was instructed to convict the defendant of a felony if it found he either sold or transported cocaine, and the Court of Appeal had found insufficient evidence to support a determination that the defendant sold cocaine. (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1120, 1131.) The Guiton court stated that this was a purely factual question that the jury was as well equipped as any court to decide rationally. ( Id. at p. 1131.) The prosecutor had concentrated on the transportation theory during argument, and the record did not affirmatively show a reasonable probability that the jury found the defendant guilty only on the sale theory. (Ibid.) Therefore, the defendant's conviction should have been affirmed. (Ibid.)