In People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, two criminal street gangs engaged in a series of retaliatory shootings. In the most recent one, shots were fired at a house occupied by members of the defendant's gang. One of them then drove and picked up the defendant, who told his girlfriend that his "home boys were after the guys." (Herrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1461.) The defendant and his cohort then drove by a house identified with the rival gang and fired three shots, made a U-turn, drove by again, and fired more shots. On the first pass, two people were hit. (Ibid.) As a result, the defendant was convicted of (among other things) one count of active participation in a criminal street gang ( 186.22(a)) and two counts of attempted murder. (Id. at p. 1462.) The sentencing court ordered that the sentence imposed for the gang participation count run concurrently with the sentences imposed for the attempted murder counts. (Ibid.) In holding that section 654 did not require the trial court to stay the sentence imposed for the gang participation (or street terrorism) count ( 186.22(a)), the Court of Appeal in Herrera looked to the defendant's intent and objective with respect to each crime, and concluded that the street terrorism crime was "divisible" from the attempted murder crimes, and thus not subject to section 654. (Herrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1466.) The court explained that "the characteristics of attempted murder and street terrorism are distinguishable, even though aspects of one may be similar to those of the other" (ibid.); the defendant's objective in committing the attempted murders was "simply a desire to kill"; and the identities or gang affiliations of his intended victims were irrelevant. (Id. at p. 1467.) The Herrera court also explained that, in contrast, section 186.22(a) "encompasses a more complex intent and objective," noting that (1) section 186.22(a) is part of the STEP Act (discussed, ante), (2) the Legislature passed the criminal penalties set forth in the STEP Act in response to the increasing violence of street gang members throughout the state, and (3) prior to the STEP Act "there was no existing law that made the punishment for crimes by a gang member separate and distinct from that of the underlying crimes." (Herrera, supra, at p. 1467, ) Noting also that street terrorism is "a substantive offense whose gravamen is the participation in the gang itself," the Herrera court further explained that under section 186.22(a) "the defendant must necessarily have the intent and objective to actively participate in a criminal street gang." (Herrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467, ) However, it stated, the defendant "does not need to have the intent to personally commit the particular felony (e.g., murder, robbery or assault) because the focus of the street terrorism statute is upon the defendant's objective to promote, further or assist the gang in its felonious conduct, irrespective of who actually commits the offense." (Ibid., ) The Court of Appeal concluded that section 186.22(a) "requires a separate intent and objective from the underlying felony committed on behalf of the gang" , noting that "the perpetrator of the underlying crime may thus possess 'two independent, even if simultaneous, objectives,' thereby precluding application of section 654." (Herrera, supra, at p. 1468.) Turning to the facts of the case before it, the Herrera court then concluded that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant "intended to aid his gang in felonious conduct, irrespective of his independent objective to murder." (Herrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1468, ) The court explained that the defendant's active participation in his gang's "payback" against the rival gang fell "squarely within the provisions of section 186.22(a), street terrorism," which "required the defendant to actively participate in a criminal street gang, have knowledge that its members engage in criminal activity, and have the intent and objective to further the gang's felonious conduct." (Ibid.) The court also explained that the defendant "had the simultaneous although separate objective to actively participate in and promote his gang when he attempted to murder rival gang members." (Ibid., ) Finally, in support of its holding that the trial court was not required to stay the street terrorism sentence under section 654, the Herrera court added: "If section 654 were held applicable here, it would render section 186.22(a) a nullity whenever a gang member was convicted of the substantive crime committed in furtherance of the gang." (Herrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1468.) Citing People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211, for the proposition that the purpose of section 654 is to insure that a defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his culpability, the Herrera court stated, "We do not believe the Legislature intended to exempt the most culpable parties from the punishment under the street terrorism statutes." (Herrera, supra, at p. 1468, ) Herrera thus stands for the propositions that (1) section 654 does not preclude multiple punishment for both gang participation ( 186.22(a)) and the underlying felony, at least when the underlying felony requires a specific intent; and (2) and as long as there is both sufficient evidence of the specific intent necessary to support the conviction for gang participation, and sufficient evidence of the specific intent necessary to support the conviction for the underlying felony, as a matter of law there is sufficient evidence the defendant had two independent, if simultaneous, objectives. In People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, the defendant, a gang member, fired three shots at a rival gang member's house from the front passenger seat of a vehicle. One bullet struck an 11-year-old boy and another bullet struck a man in the left shoulder, breaking a bone. The vehicle then made a U-turn and returned for a second pass, and approximately 10 additional shots were fired but no further injuries were inflicted. A jury convicted the defendant of a variety of offenses including one count of street terrorism and two counts of attempted murder. (Id. at p. 1462.) In pertinent part, the trial court imposed a separate term for the street terrorism conviction. On appeal, the defendant argued section 654 prohibited the imposition of a separate term on the street terrorism conviction. The court stated: "Since Neal v. State of California (1960)... the test under section 654 has been: 'Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.' In ... Latimer ... our Supreme Court reaffirmed the Neal approach and noted several cases in which the 'intent and objective' test had been applied to sustain multiple sentences. The Latimer court also clarified that section 654 applies to sentencing both for crimes flowing from a single act and for crimes resulting from an indivisible course of conduct which violates more than one statute. " (Herrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1466.) The Herrera court also pointed out that in passing the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (the Street Gang Act; 186.20 et seq.), the Legislature was responding to the increasing violence of street gang members throughout the state and noted no "existing law ... made the punishment for crimes by a gang member separate and distinct from that of the underlying crimes. " (Herrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467.) In People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, "the defendant was charged with a course of criminal conduct involving two gang-related, drive-by shootings in which two people were injured. " (People v. Vu, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1034.) The shootings were committed in retaliation against a rival gang who had shot at members of the defendant's gang. We held that "under section 186.22, subdivision (a) the defendant must necessarily have the intent and objective to actively participate in a criminal street gang. However, he does not need to have the intent to personally commit the particular felony (e.g., murder, robbery or assault) because the focus of the street terrorism statute is upon the defendant's objective to promote, further or assist the gang in its felonious conduct, irrespective of who actually commits the offense. ... Hence, section 186.22, subdivision (a) requires a separate intent and objective from the underlying felony committed on behalf of the gang. The perpetrator of the underlying crime may thus possess 'two independent, even if simultaneous, objectives,' thereby precluding application of section 654. " (People v. Herrera, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1467-1468, ) Because the evidence showed the defendant had separate intents to murder multiple victims (see id. at p. 1467 the defendant "repeatedly shot a gun on two separate occasions--the interval between the two being brief but distinct--striking cars, occupied apartments and bystanders") and to support his "gang's felonious conduct," we held section 654 did not bar punishment for both crimes (Herrera, at p. 1468).