In People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, the defendant grabbed the victim who was standing in a school parking lot waiting for her boyfriend. (Id. at pp. 621-622.) The defendant knocked the victim to the ground, covered her mouth and took various personal items from her. (Ibid.) He then walked her to her car, which was approximately 40 feet away, and pushed her inside her vehicle while the alarm was sounding. As the defendant was getting in the vehicle, the victim was able to escape. (Ibid.) The jury found the defendant guilty of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking. ( 209.5.) On appeal from an aggravated kidnapping conviction, the defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because the movement of the victim was incidental to the robbery and it did not substantially increase the victim's risk of harm. The court disagreed, pointing out that the 40-foot movement across the parking lot was not an "insubstantial distance." (Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 629.) The court also emphasized that the defendant had already taken possession of the victim's wallet and keys when he forced her to walk to her car, so the movement was not incidental to the robbery. (Id. at p. 630.) In addition, forcing the victim into a vehicle, removing her from public view, and intending to drive her away, subjected the victim to an increased risk of harm. (Ibid.) It was inconsequential that the victim managed to escape, because the fact that the defendant's plan was thwarted "does not mean that the risk of harm was not increased." (Ibid.) On appeal, the parties agreed that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the offense of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking requires a completed carjacking and no completed carjacking had taken place. (Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 624.) The appellate court determined, however, that the jury's findings supported the lesser-included offense of attempted carjacking. (Id. at pp. 627-628.) The trial court had instructed the jury, in connection with the original charge, that the " 'specific intent to facilitate the commission of carjacking must be present when the kidnapping commences.' " (Id. at p. 627.) The court had also instructed the jury " 'it is not necessary to establish that this purpose was accomplished. The crime is complete if the kidnapping is done for that purpose.' " (Id. at p. 628.) Although the appellate court presumed this latter instruction was incorrect insofar as it applied to the kidnapping for carjacking offense, since the jury was so instructed and returned a guilty verdict, the jury effectively found a direct but ineffectual act done towards the commission of the carjacking, i.e., the forcible moving of the victim with the intent to carjack. (Ibid.) Therefore, by convicting the defendant of kidnapping during the commission of carjacking under the instructions it was given, the jury determined both the elements required to prove attempted carjacking: (1) the specific intent to facilitate the commission of carjacking and (2) a direct act done towards the commission of the offense. (Ibid.) The prosecution tried to prove the defendant suffered a prior strike conviction based on his federal bank robbery conviction (18 U.S.C., 2113(a)). The record, however, did not "'reliably reflect the facts of the offense for which the defendant was convicted.'" (Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 634.) The evidence consisted only of a fingerprint card listing the crime as "'Bank Robbery,'" plus a judgment stating the defendant pled guilty "'to the lesser included offense of violation of ... Sections 2113(a) the Indictment herein charging a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113(a) and 2113(d).'" (Id. at p. 633.) The fingerprint card referred only to the statute as a whole. Moreover, the charges "apparently contained in the indictment" (id. at p. 634) did not establish the nature of the defendant's conduct because he pled guilty only to a lesser included offense, not to the charges as stated in the indictment. (Ibid.) Therefore, the defendant had to be adjudged guilty of the least offense possible under the statute, which was equivalent to second degree burglary under California law. The finding that his prior conviction was a strike could not be sustained. (Id. at pp. 633-635.) United States Code section 2113(a) provides: "Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association; or P Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting such bank or such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny-- P Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."