In People v. Klaess (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 820, the defendant pled guilty to being an accessory after the fact to murder in exchange for the dismissal of two counts of murder. (Klaess, at pp. 822-823.) The sentencing court relied upon the aggravating factors "that the crime to which the defendant was an accessory was known to her to have involved great bodily harm and the defendant was aware the underlying crimes involved multiple victims, one of whom was particularly vulnerable." (Id. at pp. 823-824.) The Court of Appeal found these facts "transactionally related" to the defendant's admitted crime because the facts "were inseparably and integrally a part of the defendant's admitted offense." (Id. at p. 823.) The court explained: "The crime of accessory after the fact is an offense separate and distinct from the underlying felony. . . . . . . It is the intentional act with knowledge of a principal's crime for which an accessory is punished. All other things being equal, an accessory after the fact to a felony involving fraudulent checks undoubtedly would not bear the same degree of culpability as an accessory after the fact to a multiple murder. The level of depravity of the principal is not irrelevant to the level of depravity of one who is willing to and who does knowingly render the principal aid after the fact. Defendant's culpability for her admitted offenses can only be fully gauged by examining what she knew about the crime to which she was an accessory. Defendant's knowledge when acting as an accessory was a circumstance integrally a part of her admitted offense. Consideration of that knowledge by the sentencing judge did not violate the proscription of People v. Harvey, 25 Cal.3d 754." (Id. at pp. 823-824.)