In People v. Wilkins (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, two police officers arrived at a residence to investigate a report of a domestic dispute. The victim, who was very upset and crying uncontrollably, met the police outside of the home. She told the police officers that her husband (the defendant), had hit her in the face. She asked the officers to go inside the residence to arrest him. Defendant opened the door part way to the uniformed officers' knocking. One of the officers told him "they needed to come in and talk with him." (Id. at p. 768.) Defendant refused to allow both officers to enter. When the defendant tried to close the door on them, one officer inserted his foot and hand, forced open the door, and reached for defendant's wrist. "Defendant backed away and began flailing his arms and yelling at the officers to get out." (Ibid.) As the defendant retreated inside, the officers followed him in, grabbed him in a bear hug and tried to calm him down, but defendant continued to yell and then "'lunged forward,' grabbing the officer's baton." (Ibid.) A melee ensued, culminating in defendant being handcuffed, dragged from the residence, placed in leg restraints, maced, and eventually forcibly strapped onto an ambulance board and taken to the hospital. In that case, a jury convicted the defendant of resisting an executive officer ( 69) and other charges. (Wilkins, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on exigent circumstances, and consent, and knock notice requirements, in connection with section 69's lawful performance of duty element. (Id. at pp. 767, 776-777, 779, & fns. 8, 10.) The court reasoned that "in order for the officers to have effected a lawful non-consensual entry into the house to make a warrantless arrest, they must not only have had reasonable cause to believe defendant had committed a felony but there must also have been exigent circumstances justifying the officers immediate entry without obtaining a warrant. The instructional lacuna is not one which can be cured simply by clarification and amplification because the instructions given completely omit to address a material constituent of an element necessary for conviction. Accordingly, the court had a duty sua sponte to instruct on exigent circumstances." (Id. at p. 777.) In a footnote, the court indicated that jury should also have been instructed "on consent as it bears on the lawfulness of the entry and arrest" because under the People's theory of the case, the entry to arrest was justified by both exigent circumstances and consent, and there was substantial evidence of consent. (Id. at p. 777, fn. 8.) Citing the court's obligation to instruct on general principles of law governing the case, the Wilkins court observed: "At a minimum, this obligation requires instruction on the elements of the offense charged.. . . Lawfulness of the arrest is an element of a resisting arrest offense which normally must be submitted to the jury. . . .. . . 'It has long been recognized that a trial judge "may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how conclusive the evidence." . . . The prohibition against directed verdicts "includes perforce situations in which the judge's instructions fall short of directing a guilty verdict but which nevertheless have the effect of so doing by eliminating other relevant considerations if the jury finds one fact to be true." . . . . . . The rule prohibiting verdicts directed against an accused emanates from the guarantee of due process and the right to a jury trial. Due process "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. . . ."'" (Wilkins, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 777-778)