In Kovatch v. California Casualty Management Co. (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1266-1267 [77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217] California court compared the element of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, "outrageous conduct," in the sexual harassment context to the sexual orientation harassment context. We said, "In Fisher[, supra, 214 Cal. App. 3d 590], the court held that '. . . by its very nature, sexual harassment in the work place is outrageous conduct as it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society. Accordingly, if properly pled, sexual harassment will constitute the outrageous behavior element of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . .' ( Id. at p. 618.) We hold that the same is true of harassment based on sexual orientation." ( Kovatch, supra, at p. 1278, italics added.) We then found that Kovatch's evidence was sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether a reasonable person would have found working conditions at his former employer's office intolerable, and was also sufficient to create a triable issue as to whether the conduct he experienced was outrageous. (Ibid.) "California law expressly prohibits discrimination in any aspect of employment based on actual or perceived sexual orientation. ( Lab. Code, 1102.1, subd. (a).) Accordingly, a plaintiff who was actually discharged because of his or her sexual orientation may bring a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. [Citing Leibert, supra, 32 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1702-1704.] Likewise, a plaintiff who was constructively discharged because of harassment based on actual or perceived sexual orientation may bring such a claim." (65 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1266-1267, italics added.) the court compared the element of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, "outrageous conduct," in the sexual harassment context to the sexual orientation harassment context. We said, "In Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 590], the court held that '. . . by its very nature, sexual harassment in the work place is outrageous conduct as it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society. To determine if the trial court correctly concluded that allegations of a hostile work environment, based on harassment on the basis of sexual orientation, fell outside the scope of coverage of Labor Code section 1102.1, we are required to set forth the evolution of the Labor Code statutory scheme, dealing with political freedom in the workplace, in which Labor Code section 1102.1 appears. ( Lab. Code, 1101 et seq.) We are then required to account for the effect of the Legislature's 1999 decision to repeal Labor Code section 1102.1 and place its protections within the California Fair Employment and Housing Act instead, as part of Govenment Code section 12940, subdivision (h)(1). Because of that enactment, California Fair Employment and Housing Act now deals with sexual orientation as a prohibited subject of workplace harassment, in addition to many other enumerated categories, such as race, national origin, sex and so forth. ( 12940, subd. (h).) In Leibert v. Transworld Systems, Inc. (1995) 32 Cal. App. 4th 1693, 1703-1704 [39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65], the court concluded that the fundamental public policy against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was adequately expressed in Labor Code section 1101 et seq. to meet the requirements for pleading a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.