Williams v. Taylor

In Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal. App. 3d 745, the president of a car dealership investigated the work of a discharged employee and reported what he believed to be criminal activity to the police. ( Id. at p. 750.) After a criminal investigation, the employee was charged with several crimes. Some of the charges were dismissed, and the employee was acquitted of the remaining crimes. (Ibid.) The court in Williams concluded that the absolute privilege shielded the president's report to the police, reasoning that the qualified privilege was inadequate to provide the " 'open channel of communication' " between citizens and police needed for effective investigation of crimes. (Id. at pp. 753-754) The Court stated: "A communication concerning possible wrongdoing, made to an official governmental agency such as a local police department, and which communication is designed to prompt action by that entity, is as much a part of an 'official proceeding' as a communication made after an official investigation has commenced. . . . In order for an investigation to be effective, 'there must be an open channel of communication by which citizens can call his attention to suspected wrongdoing. . . . A qualified privilege is inadequate under the circumstances . . . . The importance of providing to citizens free and open access to governmental agencies for the reporting of suspected illegal activity outweighs the occasional harm that might befall a defamed individual. Thus the absolute privilege is essential.' . . . And, since the privilege . . . is absolute, it cannot be defeated by a showing of malice." ( Id. at pp. 753-754.) The Court of Appeal affirmed a summary judgment in defendants' favor, finding the president's report to the police was absolutely privileged under section 47, subdivision (b)(3) even if the president made the report with malice. The court concluded "a communication concerning possible wrongdoing, made to an official governmental agency such as a local police department, and which communication is designed to prompt action by that entity, is as much a part of an 'official proceeding' as a communication made after an initial investigation has commenced." (Williams v. Taylor, supra, 129 Cal. App. 3d at page 753.) In sum, plaintiff's former employer, Taylor Motors, conducted an investigation indicating that he was performing unauthorized work in the employer's body shop and terminated him. Subsequently, two insurance adjusters who regularly referred business to the body shop were informed that plaintiff had been terminated and why. As to the adjusters, the court noted that because the adjusters referred their casualty business to the shop, " 'as such, they were of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further a common interest of both the communicator and the recipient.' (Deaile v. General Telephone Co. of California, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at p. 847.)" (Williams v. Taylor, supra, at p. 752.) The statement made to an unidentified official at the Department of Employment Development was privileged under the "official proceeding" prong of Civil Code section 47, former subdivision 3, now subdivision (c) (Stats. 1990, ch. 1491, 1). (Williams v. Taylor, supra, at p. 754.) The court held that this fell within the qualified privilege because "both Swanson and Sanford the two insurance adjusters dealt on a continuing basis with Taylor Motors, and specifically with the manager of the body shop -- the position held by plaintiff before he was fired. If, as defendants believed, plaintiff abused his position as body shop manager by engaging in criminal activity, it was important for defendants to bring this fact to the attention of those who directed business to that part of the operation. Defendants were not only protecting their own interests, but also the interests of the adjusters who referred business to Taylor Motors." (Id. at pp. 751-752.)