Rapid Motor Lines, Inc. v. Cox

In Rapid Motor Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 134 Conn. 235, 56 A.2d 519 (1947) the Court sought to determine whether the sending of notice on the last day of the notice period, which notice was not received by the defendant until the following day, satisfied the notice requirement of the predecessor to General Statutes 13a-144 , the state highway defect statute. Rapid Motor Lines, Inc. v. Cox, supra, 134 Conn. at 237. The court stated that "one meaning of the verb 'give' is 'to make over or bestow.' Another is 'to deliver or transfer; to . . . hand over.' The idea of delivery is predominant in other meanings of the word. . . . It is obvious from the context of the statute that 'give' was not used in the former sense. To accord it the latter meaning is the reasonable and natural interpretation, in view of the purpose of the provision, which, it must be held, is to fix a definite limit upon the time within which notice shall be received by the highway commissioner. Any other construction would give rise to needless and undesirable uncertainty. Under 13a-149 of the General Statutes, imposing like liability upon municipalities for defects in highways which they are bound to maintain, the clause 'notice . . . shall . . . be given' requires a completed act within the number of days prescribed by the statute." Id. at 237-38.