In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Huntington National Bank, 609 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1992), the Court applied the plain, literal meaning of section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which provided: "Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law, the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer which requires the lessee to obtain insurance acceptable to the lessor . . . shall not be deemed the owner of said motor vehicle for the purpose of determining financial responsibility for the operation of said motor vehicle . . . ." In that case, Aetna argued that the statute only applied to long-term leases that were "automobile financing substitutes" because during the legislative debate preceding passage of the bill later codified as section 324.021(9)(b), the sponsor of the proposed bill described long term leases as "an alternative way of financing an automobile." Aetna, 609 So. 2d at 1317. The Court expressly rejected Aetna's argument, stating: In this case, the statute clearly states that "the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer . . . shall not be deemed the owner" of the vehicle for purposes of determining financial responsibility for the operation of the vehicle or for the acts of the operator of the vehicle. 324.021(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). The statute places two restrictions upon the type of motor vehicle lease that would exempt the owner/lessor from liability: 1) the lease must be "for 1 year or longer"; and 2) the lease must require the lessee "to obtain insurance acceptable to the lessor which contains limits not less than $ 100,000/$ 300,000 bodily injury liability and $ 50,000 property damage liability." Id. The statute contains no language that would restrict its application to leases which are financing substitutes, as Aetna urges. Moreover, section 324.021(9)(b) specifically states that its terms are applicable "notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law." Aetna argues that the legislative debate evidences a legislative intent that section 324.021(9)(b) only applies to long-term leases which are financing substitutes. On the contrary, legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. It must be assumed that the legislature knows the meaning of the words and has expressed its intent by the use of the words found in the statute. S.R.G. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1978). The legislative history of a statute is irrelevant where the wording of a statute is clear. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Sutherland, 125 Fla. 282, 169 So. 679 (1936). (Aetna, 609 So. 2d at 1317.)