In Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 864 P.2d 1126 (1993), Ausman's driver's license was seized when he refused to submit to a blood alcohol test after being arrested on suspicion of DUI. Ausman retained an attorney, but the attorney failed to file a timely request for a show cause hearing and Ausman's driving privileges were consequently suspended. Ausman then retained different counsel and filed a motion to vacate the order suspending his driver's license pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). The magistrate denied Ausman's motion after perceiving a conflict between Rule 60(b)(1) and M.C.R. 9.2(b) and concluded that Rule 60(b)(1) was therefore not applicable to license suspension proceedings. The district court affirmed on the intermediate appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Ausman argued that a license suspension hearing was civil in nature and was, therefore, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Ausman further claimed that there was no conflict between Rule 60(b)(1) and M.C.R. 9.2(b) because those two rules could be consistently applied by construing M.C.R. 9.2(b) as requiring the trial court to enter an order suspending driving privileges if no hearing was requested within seven days but not prohibiting the court from subsequently granting relief from that order upon the grounds provided by Rule 60(b)(1). Although the Supreme Court agreed that the pleading rules of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure were applicable to license suspension proceedings, the Court noted that no appellate decision had ever held that all of the civil rules applied to such proceedings. The Court concluded that it would be inconsistent for courts to have no discretion as to whether to suspend a driver's license if no hearing was requested within seven days pursuant to I.C. 18-8002 and M.C.R. 9.2(b) but then later be given discretion to vacate the suspension under Rule 60(b)(1). The Court viewed the issue as one involving the interpretation of a specific rule, M.C.R. 9.2(b), and a more general rule, Rule 60(b)(1). The Court noted that a specific statute, and by analogy a specific rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls over a more general statute or rule when there is any conflict between the two or when the general statute or rule is vague or ambiguous. The Court concluded that I.C. 18-8002(3) and M.C.R. 9.2(b) are clear, specific, and mandatory with respect to what a trial court must do if a driver refused to take a blood alcohol test and failed to request a show cause hearing within seven days, and that Rule 60(b)(1) was a general rule of civil procedure by which a trial court was given discretion whether to grant relief from an order or judgment. Therefore, the Court held that a conflict would arise if Rule 60(b)(1) were available to remedy Ausman's untimely request for a show cause hearing. Consequently, the Court held that M.C.R. 9.2(b) controlled over Rule 60(b)(1) and that Rule 60(b)(1) was unavailable to relieve Ausman from his untimely request for a show cause hearing.