Should Consents In Adoption Cases Be Limited to Specific Cases and Not Considered As General Surrenders ?
In Johnson v. Burnett, 182 Ill. App. 3d 574, 538 N.E.2d 892, 131 Ill. Dec. 517 (1989), the petitioners seeking adoption also argued that a consent to adopt, which was signed by the parents in another adoption case, should be treated as a general surrender for adoption.
The consents had the caption of the Johnsons' case and were filed in the that case.
The Johnson court construed Mitchell as holding that a consent is "specific to the case it was prepared for, and did not act as a general surrender." Johnson, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 538 N.E.2d at 896.
The court further held, "it is evident section 10(A) does contemplate the existence of a pending petition seeking adoption." Johnson, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 580, 538 N.E.2d at 896, citing Mitchell, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 172, 450 N.E.2d at 370, and In re Kerwood, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1044, 359 N.E.2d 183, 186, 3 Ill. Dec. 773 (1976).
Thus, the court held the consents were "limited in applicability to the Johnson case and may not be considered as general surrenders." Johnson, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 580, 538 N.E.2d at 896.