ADM Partnership v. Martin

In ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 90-91, 702 A.2d 730 (1997), the plaintiff-employee fell on an icy sidewalk as she attempted to make a delivery to a business owned by the defendants. 348 Md. at 88. The employee acknowledged that she could have returned to her truck and radioed her employer that it was too dangerous to complete the assigned task. Id. at 99. Under such circumstances, the Court of Appeals determined that there was "no evidence that the employee's act of traversing the ice and snow covered parking lot and walkway was not volitional." Id. Instead, the Court determined that the plaintiff-employee assumed the risk of falling on ice. Id. at 103. In ADM Partnership v. Martin, the plaintiff, was a delivery driver. While attempting to deliver blueprints to a customer, she fell as she walked across an icy parking lot leading to the customer's office. She sued the building owner for negligence, alleging that it had failed to make the parking lot safe. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the building owner at the close of the plaintiff's case, on a finding that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of her injury, as a matter of law. The Court reversed, holding that the issue of voluntariness was a jury question. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed the trial court, concluding that "there was no evidence that the plaintiff's act of traversing the ice and snow covered parking lot and walkway was not volitional." 348 Md. at 99. The Court held that as a matter of law, the plaintiff "exercised her own volition in encountering a known danger, and thus voluntarily assumed the risks it entailed." Id. at 103. The plaintiff in ADM Partnership had testified that the only path she could take to access her customer's building was across the icy parking lot. She further had testified that she had believed that if she did not deliver the blueprints, she would lose her job. She argued on appeal that this testimony about her subjective belief was sufficient to make voluntariness a jury question. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the fact the plaintiff believed was the case -- that she would lose her job if she did not make the delivery -- existed, other than in her mind: While the testimony of the affected person ordinarily is sufficient, without more, to support a verdict and thus generate a jury question . . . where the proof of the state of mind itself depends upon the proof of another fact, the witness's testimony alone will not suffice. There must, in addition, be some evidence of that critical fact and there is not a shred of evidence from which the plaintiff's concern for her job if the delivery were not made can be inferred. 348 Md. at 100-01. In sum, the plaintiff was an employee of a blueprint reproduction company and was making a delivery to the business in Rockville owned by the defendants. The plaintiff slipped and fell on an ice and snow-covered walkway as she returned to her vehicle. The trial judge granted judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, had assumed a known risk. The Court of Special Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the assumption of risk was a jury question. Martin v. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. 652, 666 A.2d 876 (1995). The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of this Court, holding that the assumption of the risk had been established as a matter of law. For the Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Bell described the situation confronting the plaintiff as she approached the building. Although it had snowed some nineteen hours earlier and the precipitation had ceased, ice and snow surrounded the building, particularly the parking lot directly in front of the building and the entrance walkway. Martin testified at trial that she observed that there was ice and unplowed snow surrounding the building when she arrived at the building, and that she wondered why the walkways had not been cleared. Despite the condition of the parking lot and the entrance walkway, Martin testified that, because she observed that there were other vehicles in the parking lot, that people were working inside the building, and that there were footprints in the snow and ice, suggesting that there was a safe means of ingress and egress to and from the building, she felt that she could safely enter the building. Martin also testified that, although her employer never told her that she could lose her job if she did not make the subject delivery, or any other deliveries she was assigned to make, she believed that she had no choice but to deliver the blueprints. As she saw it, if the delivery was not made, Ideal Reprographics could have lost that delivery contract, with the consequence that her employment could then have been terminated. (348 Md. at 88-89.) On her way into the building, the plaintiff initially slipped on the ice but avoided falling by grabbing onto her vehicle. On returning from the building, however, she again slipped, fell, and injured her lower back. In holding that assumption of risk had been established, as a matter of law, Judge Bell reiterated that the test is an objective one. "In determining whether a plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of the risk, an objective standard must be applied and a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to him." Thus, "when it is clear that a person of normal intelligence in the position of the plaintiff must have understood the danger, the issue is for the court." Moreover, "there are certain risks which anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate: the danger of slipping on ice, of falling through unguarded openings, of lifting heavy objects .. and doubtless many others." Id. at 91-92.