In Admiral Mortgage Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 543, 745 A.2d 1026 (2000), the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer in an MWPCL claim. The Court concluded that, on the summary judgment record, the employee had presented evidence that, if credited, tended to show that the employer did not believe in good faith that wages were not owed to the employee.In Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, an employee brought a state action to recover unpaid commissions from his former employer; the statute upon which the employee relied also authorized an award of treble damages. Id. at 1027. One of the principal issues before the court was whether the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to determine the issue of treble damages. Ibid. In addressing that issue, the Maryland High Court noted that in some statutes, the trebling provision is mandatory. Id. at 1033. In those cases, the court noted that "the prevailing practice under the Federal antitrust and RICO statutes is for the jury to determine the compensatory damages and for the judge then to apply the automatic multiplier and triple that amount. Indeed, the Federal courts have held, in both antitrust and RICO actions, that it is error for the jury even to be told about the trebling provision. The automatic trebling provision has been held to be "irrelevant to the jury's deliberations," and concern has been expressed that informing the jury of the provision may cause it to adjust its compensatory award and thus distort its true function of finding damages. That view prevails notwithstanding that neither the antitrust nor the RICO statute specifies whether the trebling is to be done by the judge or the jury." [Id. at 1034 .] However, where trebling is "discretionary, rather than fixed, there is no basis for a concern that the jury might be inclined to find less in compensatory damages than otherwise would be justified, for it would remain in control of any additional statutory award." Ibid. Because the statute in question in Admiral Mortgage involved a discretionary trebling award, ibid., the Maryland court concluded that it was not error for the jury to have decided the "extent of additional damages" awarded to plaintiff. Id. at 1035. Judge Wilner noted the difference between a basic violation of the Wage Payment Law and an aggravated violation. Admiral views 3-507.1(a) as establishing the private right of action by an employer to recover unpaid wages .... Section 3-507.1(b), however, deals with penalties, not the basic right to recover the wages. In Admiral Mortgage v. Cooper, an employee successfully sued his employer for unpaid wages pursuant to 3-505 and 3-507.1. The employee also sought, under 3-507.1(b), "not only the unpaid commissions but also treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs." The jury awarded the employee almost treble damages plus $ 12,709 in attorney's fees. 347 Md. at 536. The Court of Appeals held that although it was proper for the jury to have decided both 1) the occurrence of the triggering event for enhanced damages (the absence of a bona fide dispute) and also 2) the amount of the enhanced damages award, the jury should not have rendered any decision with respect to atorney's fees. Whether to make such an award and also the amount of the award were both within the exclusive province of the trial judge. Judge Wilner's opinion distinguished the question of enhanced damages and the question of attorney's fees. There is a distinction to be drawn between the additional damages and an award of attorneys' fees (and costs). ... The additional damages allowed under 3-507.1(b) is neither required to be awarded nor fixed in amount. The plaintiff may be awarded an amount "not exceeding 3 times the wage." Not only is any award discretionary, but the amount that may be awarded is flexible, from zero up to three times the wage. That kind of discretion is ordinarily committed to the trier of fact, subject, of course, if the trier of fact is a jury, to the authority of the judge to order a remittitur. Attorneys' fees and costs are another matter. For one thing, they may continue to accrue after the verdict is rendered, if post-trial motions or appeals are filed, so the jury cannot determine them definitively. Attorneys' fees, moreover, when allowed, have traditionally been set by the judge, who is usually in a far better position than a jury to determine what is reasonable. 357 Md. at 547-48. In Admiral Mortgage v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 540-41, 745 A.2d 1026 (2000), the Court applied sections 3-505 and 3-507.1 to a mortgage loan officer whose wages included commissions payable after the closing of a loan that he had generated or developed. See Admiral Mortgage, 357 Md. at 540. The Admiral Mortgage Court concluded that after the employment terminated, section 3-505 applied to the payment of such irregularly occurring commissions. "Under that statute, if the employee was due a commission on the closing of a loan generated or developed by him, the commission should have been paid, at the latest, when the loan was closed. Section 3-507.1 gives an employee a civil cause of action to recover wages withheld in violation of section 3-505." 357 Md. at 540-41. The opinion elaborated on why the fee-shifting determination should be made by the trial judge rather than by a jury: There are good reasons for having the judge, rather than a jury, determine the amount of fee to be paid by the losing party under a statutory fee-shifting provision. ... Those factors are more judgmental than fact-based and are more apt to be within the expertise of a judge rather than of lay jurors. ... Although the discretionary additional damages is for the trier of fact to determine, the determination of attorneys' fees, and costs, is for the judge. 357 Md. at 552-53.