In Ashley v. Mattingly, 176 Md. App. 38, 51, 932 A.2d 757 (2007), the appellant, Ashley, married the appellee, Mattingly, in 1990. The marriage took place after Mattingly had expressly represented to Ashley that she was not pregnant. Ashley, 176 Md. App. at 41. Eight months after the marriage, Mattingly gave birth to a son, Chase. At the time of Chase's birth, Mr. Ashley believed he was the father because of Mr. Mattingly's express, false representation that she was not pregnant at the time they wed. Id. The parties separated the following month. Id. Ashley filed for divorce in 1992, alleging that the parties had a son and requesting reasonable visitation. In her answer, Mattingly also asserted that the parties were the parents of Chase. Id. The trial court issued a judgment of absolute divorce, which awarded sole custody of Chase to Mattingly, granted Ashley reasonable visitation, and ordered him to pay child support. Id. Twelve years after the divorce, Ashley developed the belief that Chase was not his biological son, and filed a "Complaint for Discontinuance of Child Support and Request for Paternity Testing." Id. at 42. The trial court granted the mother's motion to dismiss the complaint. Id. at 42-43. On appeal, the Court held that, as to the request for genetic testing, the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. Id. at 62. After reviewing the Paternity Act and other statutory provisions, along with other appellate cases, we held that E.T. 1-206(a) applied, because Chase was born during the parties' marriage, even if, arguably, he was not conceived during the marriage. Id. The Court said, id. at 62-63 : The court had discretion to order genetic testing to determine paternity if it first determined that it was in the child's best interest to do so. Because the court did not recognize that it had such discretion, it erred. See Beverly v. State, 349 Md. 106, 127, 707 A.2d 91 (1998) (finding reversible error, resulting in a remand for a new sentencing, where sentencing judge failed to recognize "that she had discretion to sentence in accord with the plea agreement"). Therefore, we shall vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings, at which the circuit court must consider whether it is in Chase's bests interests to order genetic testing. The Court instructed that, in deciding whether to order genetic testing, the circuit court had to consider whether such testing comported with the best interests of the child. Id. at 62. In Ashley v. Mattingly, "we expressed no opinion on the merits of whether it would be in Chase's best interest for the court to order genetic testing or any other relief in the event that the genetic testing definitely establish ed that Ashley is was not Chase's biological father." Id. at 63. In a footnote, however, we provided guidance to the court on remand. The Court observed that, when a party learns he is not the child's father, but waits to file suit challenging paternity, "the length of delay may have a bearing on the 'best interest' analysis." Id. at 63, n.14. The Court also recognized that the State has a vital "'interest in ensuring that children born of a marriage do not suffer financially or psychologically merely because of a parent's belated and self-serving concern of a child's biological origins.'" Id. at 63, n.15 .