In Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 326, 941 A.2d 1107 (2008), the Court of Appeals addressed whether the State can be considered a party-opponent in a criminal prosecution for evidentiary purposes. Bellamy was convicted of first-degree murder and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and sentenced to life in prison. Id. at 318. The State reached a plea agreement with Saunders, a co-defendant, which required Saunders to plead guilty to being an accessory after the fact to the murder, contingent on Saunders testifying, if required, at Bellamy's trial. Id. at 315. At Saunders's guilty plea proceeding, the prosecutor stated that Saunders accurately identified Welch, not Bellamy, as the shooter. Id. at 316-17. At his trial, Bellamy sought to have the prosecutor's statement from Saunders's guilty plea proceeding--identifying Welch as the shooter--admitted as evidence. Id. at 318. The State objected, arguing that the statement was inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court agreed. Id. Bellamy appealed contending, in pertinent part, that "the statement should have been admitted as an adoptive admission of a party opponent (the State) under Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(2)." Id. at 319. "Bellamy's theory is that the State manifested its 'adoption or belief in . . . the truth' of Saunders's statement when the Assistant State's Attorney stated at the plea hearing, 'And it is our belief, based on our investigation and review of everything, is that he's been truthful.'" Id. at 320. The State, in contrast, argued on appeal that it "should not be considered a 'party-opponent' in a criminal prosecution for evidentiary purposes." Id. at 320. The Court of Appeals held that: "First, the Assistant State's Attorneys unequivocally manifested an adoption of or belief in Saunders's statement when they said, "And it is our belief, based on our investigation and review of everything, is that he's been truthful," "We want him to be truthful and we believe he has been," and, "But our understanding is the truth has been reduced to writing and the statement he provided to us." Without this express, in-court adoption of Saunders's statement, our view may have been different. Whether lesser actions by a prosecutor manifesting an adoption of a statement, such as merely submitting the statement in support of a court filing or acceptance of a plea, would render the statement admissible against the government in a subsequent proceeding remains to be seen." Id. at 326. The Court, however, concluded that "the error in excluding the testimony was harmless, and thus, Bellamy's conviction must be affirmed." Id. at 330. In Bellamy v. State, the State entered into a plea agreement with a witness to murder, Andre Saunders. Id. at 315-18. Prior to a proffer of the pertinent facts in support of that plea, the State informed the trial court that Saunders had provided a written statement and that the State believed Saunders to be truthful. Id. at 315-16. The court then heard a proffer of facts, based on Saunders's statement, in which Saunders informed the State that a person named Welch, not Bellamy, had shot the victim. Id. at 317. At Bellamy's trial, Bellamy sought to call both Saunders and Welch, but they invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 318. Bellamy then sought to have the portions of the proffer of facts from Saunders's plea hearing admitted into evidence, and that request was denied by the trial court. Id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statement of facts from Saunders's plea hearing should have been admitted at trial as an admission of a party opponent, but that, ultimately, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 319, 335. As for the merits, the Court stated: "The Assistant State's Attorneys unequivocally manifested an adoption of or belief in Saunders's statement when they said, "And it is our belief, based on our investigation and review of everything, is that he's been truthful," "We want him to be truthful and we believe he has been," and, "But our understanding is the truth has been reduced to writing and the statement he provided to us." Without this express, in-court adoption of Saunders's statement, our view may have been different. Whether lesser actions by a prosecutor manifesting an adoption of a statement, such as merely submitting the statement in support of a court filing or acceptance of a plea, would render the statement admissible against the government in a subsequent proceeding remains to be seen." Id. at 326 . Further, applying a test from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Court concluded that the evidence was admissible: As noted above, the three-part test requires (1) an assertion of fact clearly inconsistent with a subsequent assertion at trial; (2) the assertions of fact were equivalent to testimonial statements; and (3) that inference that the party seeking to admit the evidence wants to have the fact finder draw is a fair inference, and there is not an innocent explanation for the inconsistency. The implicated elements of the test would be satisfied in the present case. The assertion that Welch shot Carter is clearly inconsistent with the State's later assertion that Bellamy shot Carter twice. Finally, the inference that Bellamy obviously desired the jury to draw, that the State at one point believed that Welch was the sole shooter, is a fair inference. (Id. at 329-30.)