In Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 349, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), a products liability case, the Court of Appeals adopted the strict liability formula articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A, notwithstanding General Motors' insistence, among other things, that because "the warranty provisions of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code and the doctrine of strict liability in tort are substantially the same in protecting the interests of both consumers and sellers," there was "no need to adopt the theory of strict liability." Id. at 348. In rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals drew a number of distinctions between these two legal theories of recovery. It contrasted, among other things: the ability of a seller, under the Maryland UCC, to limit or disclaim warranties where the goods sold are not consumer goods, with the ineffectiveness of any such limitation or disclaimer in a tort case, under Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A, comment m, see Phipps, 278 Md. at 349; the requirement that the buyer, in a breach of warranty case, must give the seller notice of the breach, as a condition precedent for maintaining a breach of warranty action, with the absence of such a requirement in a tort action based on strict liability, id. at 349-50; and the four-year period of limitations for breach of warranty with the three-year limitations period for strict liability in tort: An action for breach of warranty is governed by the limitations period contained in 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that an action must be brought within four years of the time it accrues. . . . An action under the theory of strict liability in tort, however, would be governed by the general tort limitations period, Maryland Code (1974), 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which is three years but may begin to run at a later time. Id. at 350.