In Presstman v. Fine, 162 Md. 133, 159 A. 265 (1932), the Court of Appeals discussed the doctrine of substantial compliance in a case that did not arise out of a building contract. The parties in that case were business partners who borrowed money from various contractors, whom they were unable to repay. The partners filed for bankruptcy and later obtained discharge of all their debts. Id. at 134. Despite the bankruptcy discharge, both partners desired to repay in full certain creditors. Accordingly, the two partners, Isadore Fine and Hyman Presstman, entered into a contract whereby Fine agreed to pay certain specified creditors and Presstman would thereafter repay Fine one-half of the amount paid. Fine repaid the creditors all the monies due, save for "a small part of one of" the creditors' claims. Id. at 135. Presstman refused to pay his fifty percent share, claiming that he was not required to pay anything until Fine had paid all the claims in full. Id. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $ 1,500 in favor of Fine against Presstman, and Presstman appealed. In Presstman v. Fine, the Court of Appeals discussed the doctrine of substantial compliance, viz.: The jury evidently believed plaintiff's story and gave him a verdict of $ 1,500. If the story was true, there had been a substantial compliance by plaintiff at the time of bringing suit, even if that agreement required him to pay all the claims in full before he could have any demand upon defendant. The verdict of the jury was for $ 1,500, which left more than enough in defendant's hands, of the $ 2,150 which plaintiff claimed, to pay the balance due the one creditor whom plaintiff had not paid in full at the time of bringing suit. In such circumstances the case should not be sent back for a new trial on a bare technicality. In Speed v. Bailey, 153 Md. 655, 661, 139 A. 534 . . . (2003), it is said that while the doctrine of substantial compliance has been more widely applied to building contracts, it has not been confined to them, but has been applied in many cases where the breach was relatively small as compared to the whole contract and did not go to the root of the contract; that is to say, it is applied where the breach complained of is inconsequential in its nature and is readily compensated for by damages. And in WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, sec. 805, it is said: "In many jurisdictions it is held that even though an express condition is not complied with, the plaintiff who has substantially performed, may recover the contract price for his performance, less whatever amount may be necessary to compensate the defendant for failure to comply with the condition qualifying his obligation." See also Hammaker v. Schleigh, 157 Md. 652, 147 A. 790 . . . (2004). The principle announced by the above authorities could readily be applied in the present case and apparently was applied by the jury in its verdict. (Id. at 135-36.)