In Quinn v. Glackin, 31 Md. App. 247, 355 A.2d 523 (1976), when a 12-year-old girl rode her bicycle down her driveway and into the street, she was hit by a car and sustained serious injuries. The child's parents brought suit for negligence on her behalf against the driver. The child had no memory of the accident and could not testify about what had happened. The driver testified that he first saw the child 9 or 10 feet from the edge of the road, right before the impact. In affirming the grant of a directed verdict, the Court stated: If the evidence in this case was sufficient to show any negligence at all on the driver's part . . . then it was original negligence which continued, and concurred with the admitted negligence of the child to cause her injury. There could be no fresh opportunity available to the driver to avoid the consequences of the child's negligence until she did something negligent. Her approach down the driveway was not negligent, and did not then place her in a position of peril. Her lawful approach could not constitute notice to the driver that she would fail to yield the right of way to him. A motorist on the favored highway has the right to assume that the unfavored driver will yield the right of way. The child's negligence -- her failure to yield the right of way to a motorist on the favored highway -- was followed almost instantaneously by the accident. The trial judge correctly ruled that there was no evidence to show that the driver had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. (Id. at 254.) The Court did not see a last clear chance in an accident between a girl on a bicycle and a motorist. The adult, Mr. Glackin, saw the child heading for the street from her driveway when he was about 100 feet away from the driveway. He applied his brakes when he was about thirty feet away from her. The injured child, Marie Quinn, conceded her own negligence, but sought refuge in Mr. Glackin's failure to see her sooner and his failure to warn her of the impending danger by blowing the horn. In her view, after she headed for the street, "there was then still time for Mr. Glackin to avoid the accident." Id. at 251. This Court disagreed: If the evidence in this case was sufficient to show any negligence at all on Mr. Glackin's part, and it is unnecessary to decide whether it was, then it was original negligence which continued, and concurred with the admitted negligence of Marie Quinn to cause her injury. There could be no fresh opportunity available to Mr. Glackin to avoid the consequences of Marie Quinn's negligence until she did something negligent. Her approach down the driveway was not negligent, and did not then place her in a position of peril. Her lawful approach could not constitute notice to Mr. Glackin that she would fail to yield the right of way to him. A motorist on the favored highway has the right to assume that the unfavored driver will yield the right of way. Marie Quinn's negligence - her failure to yield the right of way to a motorist on the favored highway - was followed almost instantaneously by the accident. The trial judge correctly ruled that there was no evidence to show that Mr. Glackin had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. Id. at 254-55. Thus, the Court rejected plaintiff's attempt to split Mr. Glackin's negligence into separate acts of negligent warning and negligent doing