In Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993), the petitioners were two women. One was the biological mother of Tammy and the other was the mother's domestic partner. The two women sought to jointly adopt Tammy. The court detailed the couple's long history together and their success at raising the child as part of an intact family unit headed by two Harvard Medical School professors and aided by a full-time nanny. The court began its analysis by stating "despite the overwhelming support for the joint adoption and the judge's conclusion that joint adoption is clearly in Tammy's best interests, the question remains whether there is anything in the law of the Commonwealth which would prevent this adoption." Id. at 317. The court then noted that adoption laws must be strictly construed and explained that where the statutes are ambiguous, they should be construed to enhance their stated purpose, which in the case of the adoption laws, is to further the child's best interests. Id. at 318. The court noted that the Massachusetts statute on eligibility to adopt provides that "a person of full age may petition . . . for leave to adopt . . ." The statute requires that if the petitioner is married the spouse must join the petition. The court then opined that "the statute does not expressly prohibit or require joinder by any person." Id. The court also indicated that although the statute uses the singular "a person," there is, in Massachusetts, a legislatively mandated rule that "words importing the singular may extend and be applied to several persons" unless the result is inconsistent with legislative intent. Id. at 319. The court then held: In the context of adoption, where the legislative intent to promote the best interests of the child is evidenced throughout the governing statute, and the adoption of a child by two unmarried individuals accomplishes that goal, construing the term "person" as "persons" clearly enhances, rather than defeats, the purpose of the statute. Id. The court also noted the prohibitions on who may adopt (see note 2) and found that the legislature did not include a prohibition on adoption by two unmarried persons "like the petitioners." Id. The court concluded that the legislature did not attempt to define all possible categories of persons who might adopt. The court in Tammy therefore affirmed the joint adoption by the two women based on its finding that both women fit the statutory definition of "a person."