In Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, 16 P.3d 1120, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the rule that the law in effect at the time of a change of condition controls. The Court held that the applicable time limit "is that which was in effect at the time the claimant's condition underwent a change, and not the law in effect at the time of the injury or the law in force at the time of the original award." The Court held that an order requiring vocational rehabilitation evaluation qualified as a "last order" and preserved a claimant's reopening request. 2000 OK 86, 16 P.3d 1120. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that vocational rehabilitation services were in fact "conferrable as a benefit" under 85 O.S. 16 and "decisive of the claimant's eligibility" for evaluation by qualified professionals for services that might restore a worker to gainful employment. Such an order was "connected to the mainstream of regular compensation process," the Court said, by "substantially affecting the monetary, medical, or rehabilitative benefits conferrable" by the workers' compensation statutes, and therefore "passed muster" as a "trigger for the 43(C) time-bar." Id. The Arrow Court further held that an order's "fitness" as a "last order" also depends on "its consistency with the criteria which generally govern reviewability of compensation orders"; in other words, that the order possess qualities consistent with "reviewable" orders under the compensation law. Id. Further to this point, the Court stated: An order that is reviewable must be one which either grants or denies an award of compensation or otherwise constitutes a final determination of the rights between the parties. Many decisions other than those affecting permanent disability are deemed reviewable. For example, an order that directs an employer (or his insurance carrier) to pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses is regarded as reviewable. This is so because medical treatment is an allowance in the nature of compensation. Implicit in this teaching is the notion that orders for benefits other than those of a purely monetary character may be treated as the functional equivalent of an award. Id. The Court characterized the vocational rehabilitation order, which was reviewable, as being within "the very same category as one for monetary or medical benefits." The order thus could be "accorded equal deference" as such an order, and relied upon as a "time-bar trigger in reopening proceedings." Id. The Court in Arrow noted that the workers' compensation court in that case had also entered an order denying commutation of the claimant's award on the same day it entered the vocational rehabilitation order. In a footnote to its opinion, however, the Court stated that, because it found the vocational rehabilitation order qualified as a "last order" under 43(C), it was "unnecessary to reach for consideration whether the order denying commutation of the original award would also qualify." 2000 OK 86, n.33, 16 P.3d 1120.The Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted the words "last order" as used in 43(C). The Supreme Court held that an order only qualifies as a "last order" under 43(C) "if it substantially affects the range of monetary, medical, or rehabilitative benefits conferrable by the workers' compensation law." Id. The Arrow Court held that an order for a vocational rehabilitation evaluation qualifies as a last order. Id. In Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, 16 P.3d 1120, 1126, the Supreme Court held "an order qualifies as 'last order' within the meaning of 43(C) only if it substantially affects the range of monetary, medical or rehabilitative benefits conferred by the Workers' Compensation Law." The Supreme Court determined an order directing the employer to provide a vocational rehabilitation evaluation for claimant was the last order in the case for purposes of 43(C), not the original PPD order. In so ruling, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned "an order affording the claimant a vocational rehabilitation evaluation is decisive of the claimant's eligibility for vocational benefits. The Court held "an order qualifies as a 'last order' within the meaning of 43(C) only if it substantially affects the range of monetary, medical, or rehabilitative benefits conferrable by the workers' compensation law." The Court concluded that an order directing an employer to provide a vocational rehabilitation evaluation was a "last order." Id.