In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), Palmigiano was an inmate of the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institution charged, in a prison disciplinary proceeding, with "inciting a disturbance and disrupting prison operations, which might have resulted in a riot." 425 U.S. at 312. At his hearing before the disciplinary board, Palmigiano was advised that he was not required to testify at his disciplinary hearing and that he could remain silent but that his silence could be used against him. 425 U.S. at 316.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the drawing of an adverse inference from the inmate's silence was a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, 510 F.2d 534 (1974), but the Supreme Court reversed that decision.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the self-incrimination privilege of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids drawing adverse inferences against an inmate from his failure to testify. The State challenges this determination, and we sustain the challenge. 425 U.S. at 316.
The Prison Disciplinary Board, in finding that Palmigiano was guilty of breaking the rules, used his silence against him as one (but not the sole) circumstance pointing to his guilt.
At the hearing, Captain Baxter read the charge to Palmigiano and summarized the two reports. In the face of the reports, which he had seen, Palmigiano elected to remain silent. The Disciplinary Board's decision was based on these two reports, Palmigiano's decision at the hearing not to speak to them, and supplementary reports made by the officials filing the initial reports. 425 U.S. at 320 n.4.
The Court found no error in the drawing of an adverse inference from the inmate's silence.
The short of it is that permitting an adverse inference to be drawn from an inmate's silence at his disciplinary proceedings is not, on its face, an invalid practice; and there is no basis in the record for invalidating it as here applied to Palmigiano. 425 U.S. at 320.
Justice White reminded us that the prohibition against adverse comment, rooted in the Fifth Amendment privilege, actually derogates from, rather than enhances, the truth-seeking function.
It has little to do with a fair trial and derogates rather than improves the chances for accurate decisions. Thus, aside from the privilege against compelled self- incrimination, the Court has consistently recognized that in proper circumstances silence in the face of accusation is a relevant fact not barred from evidence by the Due Process Clause. 425 U.S. at 319.
The key to the result in Baxter v. Palmigiano is that there was no risk of incrimination because a prison disciplinary hearing is not a criminal case and the imposing of punishment for a disciplinary breach is not a conviction for crime.
Disciplinary proceedings in state prisons, however, involve the correctional process and important state interests other than conviction for crime. 425 U.S. at 319.
Even in a criminal case, the removal of the risk of incrimination by, for instance, an appropriate grant of use immunity removes the Fifth Amendment shield from the evidentiary use of silence.
Had the State desired Palmigiano's testimony over his Fifth Amendment objection, we can but assume that it would have extended whatever use immunity is required by the Federal Constitution. Had this occurred and had Palmigiano nevertheless refused to answer, it surely would not have violated the Fifth Amendment to draw whatever inference from his silence that the circumstances warranted. 425 U.S. at 318.
The appellant in this case, of course, enjoyed such use immunity for any testimony he chose to give at the suppression hearing on the issue of voluntariness.
Justice White pointed out, 425 U.S. at 318, that the evidentiary significance of silence has traditionally been recognized in civil cases.
In sum, prison inmates claimed their Fifth Amendment rights were violated at disciplinary hearings. One of the questions before the Supreme Court was whether the State was permitted to draw an adverse inference from the inmates' refusal to testify. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316.
In ruling that an adverse inference was permitted in civil cases, the Supreme Court clarified the extent to which an inference could be drawn by stating that the inmate was "advised that his silence could be used against him, but a prison inmate ... electing to remain silent during his disciplinary hearing, as respondent Palmigiano did here, is not in consequence of his silence automatically found guilty of the infraction with which he has been charged." Id. at 317.
Because the State relied on additional evidence in its case against the inmate, as opposed to merely the inmate's silence, the Court found the inmate's Fifth Amendment rights had not been violated: "as far as this record reveals, his silence was given no more evidentiary value than was warranted by the facts surrounding his case. This does not smack of an invalid attempt by the State to compel testimony without granting immunity or to penalize the exercise of the privilege." Id. at 318.