In Beard v. Federy (1865) 70 U.S. 478, the effect of a patent to land in California, after confirmation and survey, was before the court. The land was claimed under an old Mexican grant, and while the proceeding for confirmation of such claims in California differed from that pursued in New Mexico, yet the result of the confirmation was the same. There was a statutory provision that the confirmation should not prejudice the rights of third persons, and some reliance was placed upon that provision. The Supreme Court held that a patent issued pursuant to the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1851, is "a conveyance of such interest as the United States possessed in the land, and it takes effect by relation at the time when proceedings were instituted by the filing of the petition before the Board of Land Commissioners." It was said by the court, discussing this entire question, on page 492: "By it (the patent) the government declares that the claim asserted was valid under the laws of Mexico; that it was entitled to recognition and protection by the stipulations of the treaty, and might have been located under the former government, and is correctly located now, so as to embrace the premises as they are surveyed and described. As against the government this record, so long as it remains unvacated, is conclusive. And it is equally conclusive against parties claiming under the government by title subsequent. It is in this effect of the patent as a record of the government that its security and protection chiefly lie. If parties asserting interests in lands acquired since the acquisition of the country could deny and controvert this record, and compel the patentee, in every suit for his land, to establish the validity of his claim, his right to its confirmation, and the correctness of the action of the tribunals and officers of the United States in the location of the same, the patent would fail to be, as it was intended it should be, an instrument of quiet and security to its possessor. The patentee would find his title recognized in one suit and rejected in another, and if his title were maintained, he would find his land located in as many different places as the varying prejudices, interests, or notions of justice of witnesses and jurymen might suggest. Every fact upon which the decree and patent rest would be open to contestation. The intruder, resting solely upon his possession, might insist that the original claim was invalid, or was not properly located, and, therefore, he could not be disturbed by the patentee. No construction which will lead to such results can be given to the fifteenth section. The term `third persons,' as there used, does not embrace all persons other than the United States and the claimants, but only those who hold superior titles, such as will enable them to resist successfully any action of the government in disposing of the property."