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In State v. Miller (2008) 2008 UT 61 193 P.3d 92, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction for failure to instruct on an "innocent possession" defense where a homeowner cleaning up after a party possessed a pill bottle left behind by a guest, intending to return it to the guest. (Miller, supra, at pp. 93-94, 95.)

The court held that the innocent possession defense allows for the temporary possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of returning it to its lawful owner. (Miller, supra, 193 P.3d at p. 97.)

In State v. Gray (Tenn. 1996) 917 S.W.2d 668, the victim's nearly 42-year delay in reporting a sexual assault to law enforcement resulted in a lengthy preaccusation delay. (Id. at p. 671.)

According to defendant, the Gray court "held that due process barred a prosecution for a sex offense due to an excessive and prejudicial preaccusation delay, even thought 'there was no evidence in the record that the State caused the delay.' "

In Koella v. McHargue (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998) 976 S.W.2d 658, a Tennessee appellate court concluded a right of first refusal contained in a deed was not triggered where one tenant in common sold his undivided one-half interest in the property to the other tenant in common.

The deed provided in pertinent part:

"THE GRANTORS herein do hereby grant unto the Grantees a right of first refusal for said 88.80 acre tract of property ... . In the event the Grantors shall decide to sell all or any of said 88.80 acre tract, Grantors shall give written notice ... at what price said property shall be placed on the open market and the Grantees shall have 15 days to purchase said property ... ." (Id. at p. 660.)

The court noted that the deed referred to the grantors in the plural, and that it required the property to be placed on the open market. (Ibid.)

The court concluded the deed did not contemplate a private sale between cotenants. (Ibid.)

In Hamilton v. Zimmerman (1857) 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided what is widely regarded as the first judicial estoppel case in the country.

There, the plaintiff, a pharmacist, was a part owner of a pharmacy on the verge of financial ruin. The defendant bought the pharmacy, and the plaintiff continued to work there.

After the defendant sold the business, the plaintiff filed suit for a share of the profits, alleging the parties had formed a secret oral partnership that entitled him to one-half of the proceeds.

The defendant denied the existence of the partnership, contending the plaintiff was employed as a clerk. In support of his defense, the defendant relied on sworn pleadings in earlier litigation between the parties in which the plaintiff had admitted he was a clerk. ( Id. at pp. 46-47.)

The court held that the plaintiff was estopped to pursue his partnership claim, explaining:

"The plaintiff's prior pleading is at least an implied admission of the truth of the statement of the defendant--that the plaintiff was merely his clerk. And for all the purposes of the present complaint, the admission must be taken as true, without inquiring whether, as a matter of fact, it be so or not. The law, as against the plaintiff, presumes that it is true; and this presumption proceeds upon the doctrine of estoppel, which, from motives of public policy or expediency, will not, in some instances, suffer a man to contradict or gainsay, what, under particular circumstances, he may have previously said or done. This doctrine is said to have its foundation in the obligation under which every man is placed to speak and act, according to the truth of the case; and in the policy of the law to suppress the mischiefs from the destruction of all confidence in the intercourse and dealings of men, if they were allowed to deny that, which by their solemn and deliberate acts, they have declared to be true. And this doctrine applies with peculiar force, to admissions or statements made under the sanction of an oath, in the course of judicial proceedings. The chief security and safeguard for the purity and efficiency of the administration of justice, is to be found in the proper reverence for the sanctity of an oath." ( Hamilton, supra, 37 Tenn. at pp. 47-48.)

In People in Interests of M.C. (S.D. 1993) 504 N.W.2d 598, the South Dakota Supreme Court first granted a temporary stay of the transfer order pending consideration by the full court, which then denied the motion for stay. (Id. at pp. 599-600.)

Despite the lack of a stay, the court went on to reverse the transfer order, but it noted that "at the hearing on the request for a stay, the Tribe, through its counsel, assured the trial court that if the transfer was reversed, the Tribe would transfer the case back to state court." (Id. at p. 602.)

In Communication Technical Sys. v. Densmore (1998) 1998 SD 87 583 N.W.2d 125, Densmore was employed by plaintiff CTS, which entered into a contract with Gateway to provide computer programming services. (Densmore, supra, 583 N.W.2d at p. 126.)

CTS and Gateway later entered into an agreement under which Gateway agreed that during the time CTS was performing services and for one year thereafter, Gateway would not "hire, solicit or recruit any CTS employee ... ." (Ibid.)

Densmore became dissatisfied with CTS and inquired about employment with Gateway, but was told that due to the agreement, Gateway could not even discuss employment with him. Densmore left CTS and began his own consulting business, which Gateway then contracted after terminating CTS. (Ibid.)

CTS then sued Gateway for breach of contract and Densmore for business torts. (Id. at pp. 126-127.)

The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants. (Densmore, supra, 583 N.W.2d at p. 127.) The court concluded that under South Dakota's statute prohibiting the restraint of trade (which is very similar to section 16600), the provision was invalid. "CTS improperly seeks the best of both worlds. Reserving its rights under the 'at will' employment doctrine, it wants to be able to fire Densmore for any reason, arbitrary or otherwise, or for no reason at all. However, should Densmore seek employment or a consulting contract with a former customer, CTS wants that to be forbidden fruit even though Densmore never agreed to any such limitation." (583 N.W.2d at p. 129.)

In Stringer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (2009) 386 S.C. 188 687 S.E.2d 58, the plaintiff paid the full premium for a six-month automobile policy to State Farm, but a policy adjustment during the policy period caused his premium to increase and State Farm sent him a bill for the premium increase with notice that the policy would be cancelled unless he paid the increase on or before a specified date. The notice stated that payment after the due date would reinstate the policy, but there would be no coverage for the period between cancellation and reinstatement. (Id., 687 S.E.2d at p. 59.)

The plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident with an uninsured driver two days after his policy was cancelled, but he paid the premium increase after the accident and made a claim under the policy. State Farm denied the claim on the ground the policy was not in effect when the accident occurred. (Ibid.)

The trial court ruled there was uninterrupted coverage under the policy, based in part on the policy's provision that " 'payments must be made on or before the end of the current policy period.' "

The trial court in Stringer construed that sentence to mean the insured was entitled to uninterrupted coverage as long as he paid the premium increase by the end of the current policy period. (Id., 687 S.E.2d at p. 60.)

The Stringer court concluded the "trial court erred in isolating the statement 'payments must be made on or before the end of the current policy period,' from its proper context. ... In proper context, this sentence clearly refers to renewal and provides that payments of renewal premiums must be made before the end of the current policy period. This sentence does not contemplate whether the insured's payment of an additional premium before the expiration of the current policy period provides for uninterrupted coverage." (Stringer, supra, 687 S.E.2d at pp. 60-61.)

In Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Ct.App. 1999) 338 S.C. 43 524 S.E.2d 847, Laidlaw contracted with Radco to construct a "baghouse" for Laidlaw's hazardous waste incineration system.

Radco abandoned the project, and Laidlaw hired another contractor to finish the project. When placed into operation, the baghouse leaked. Laidlaw sued Radco, which was insured by Aetna.

The Aetna policy specified that it did not apply to injury or damage included within the products-completed operation hazard clause. (Id., 524 S.E.2d at p. 848.)

Aetna took the position that the claims against Radco fit within the products-completed operations hazard coverage, which Radco had not purchased. Therefore Aetna did not believe that there was any potential for coverage. (Id. at p. 849.)

As part of a settlement, Radco assigned its rights against Aetna to Laidlaw, which later sued Aetna. Aetna was granted summary judgment in the trial court on the ground that products-completed operations coverage had been specifically rejected by Radco. (Laidlaw, supra, 524 S.E.2d at pp. 849-850.)

On appeal, the court affirmed that Radco's abandonment of the work on the baghouse brought Laidlaw's claims within the scope of the products-completed operations clause. Significantly, the court pointed out that both parties agreed that Radco abandoned the work. (Id., at p. 850.)

The court explained that "when an insured abandons work on a project the insured has effectively 'completed' its work for that project, even if the project remains unfinished, thus invoking products-completed operations coverage." (Ibid.)

In Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. (S.C.Ct.App. 1999) 524 S.E.2d 847, Laidlaw contracted with Radco to construct a "baghouse" for Laidlaw's hazardous waste incineration system.

Radco abandoned the project, and Laidlaw hired another contractor to finish the project. When placed into operation, the baghouse leaked. Laidlaw sued Radco, which was insured by Aetna.

The Aetna policy specified that it did not apply to injury or damage included within the products-completed operation hazard clause. (Id. at p. 848.)

Aetna took the position that the claims against Radco fit within the products-completed operations hazard coverage, which Radco had not purchased. Therefore Aetna did not feel that there was any potential for coverage. (Id. at p. 849.)

As part of a settlement, Radco assigned its rights against Aetna to Laidlaw, which later sued Aetna. Aetna was granted summary judgment in the trial court on the ground that products-completed operations coverage had been specifically rejected by Radco. (Laidlaw, supra, 524 S.E.2d at pp. 849-850.)

On appeal, the court affirmed that Radco's abandonment of the work on the baghouse brought Laidlaw's claims within the scope of the products-completed operations clause. Significantly, the court pointed out that both parties agreed that Radco abandoned the work. (Id. at p. 850.)

The court explained that "when an insured abandons work on a project the insured has effectively 'completed' its work for that project, even if the project remains unfinished, thus invoking products-completed operations coverage." (Ibid.)

In State v. Damiano (1991) 587 A.2d 396, a Rhode Island case, the prosecution used the defendant's conduct of pointing out a newspaper article about the robbery that he was charged with and his statement, "That's me," to prove guilt.

The court explained that the newspaper article described the events of the robbery and was accompanied by a photograph of the suspected robbers.

On appeal, the court held the use of the newspaper article in evidence was error.

The court said:

"In these circumstances defendant clearly adopted the photograph that depicted him as one of the persons involved in the robbery. It might also be inferred that he adopted the headline that stated that the article related to a bank robbery. However, there is absolutely nothing in the evidence introduced by the state that could justify an inference that defendant adopted the entire narrative of the article, including the hostage-taking and subsequent events leading to the death of John Hicks. This inflammatory and prejudicial material was not adopted by defendant either specifically or by implication." (State v. Damiano, supra, at p. 399.)

In Toombs NJ Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. (1991) 404 Pa.Super. 471 591 A.2d 304, a corporation negotiated with an individual to build and operate two restaurants.

The corporation later sought to back out of the deal, resulting in a suit by the individual for breach of contract.

The corporation sought a defense under a comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy. The court found no coverage, stating:

"To allow indemnification under the facts presented here would have the effect of making the insurer a sort of silent business partner subject to great risk in the economic venture without any prospects of sharing in the economic benefit. The expansion of the scope of the insurer's liability would be enormous without corresponding compensation." (Id. at pp. 475-476 591 A.2d at p. 306.)

In Smith v. Schwartz (1960) 398 Pa. 555 159 A.2d 220, reasoned that rights of innocent third parties, namely, other persons who had procured policies after those policyholders seeking to assert the fraud defense, had intervened. (Smith v. Schwartz, supra, at p. 559 159 A.2d at p. 222.)

Further, the policyholders had not attempted to nullify the policies "within a reasonable time after they became aware of the alleged fraud by the insurance company officials, but they waited more than two years after the commencement of the suit against them to allege the defense of fraud ... ." (Id. at p. 560 159 A.2d at p. 223.)

In explaining why the other policyholders were innocent third parties who should be protected, the court painted this picture: "under mutual insurance policies, each policyholder is both an insured and insurer. He holds the umbrella of protection over the heads of his fellow-policyholders when they are pelted with losses, and has the right to have the umbrella raised over his head when losses rain down on him." (Id. at p. 556 159 A.2d at p. 221.)

In Koken v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002) 803 A.2d 807, the court reaffirmed the holding in Foster, explaining that "such a holding comports with the stated purpose of Article V to protect the interests of insureds 'through . . . equitable apportionment of any unavoidable loss' Section 501(c)(iv), 40 P.S. § 221.1(c)(iv). That purpose is best served in insurance company rehabilitations . . . by the rehabilitator's action on behalf of policyholders, where the large numbers of identical policies issued render a single forum necessary to dispose equitably of a company's limited assets." (Koken, supra, 803 A.2d at pp. 820-821.)

The court in Koken also acknowledged that the Michigan rehabilitation statute was "nearly identical to ours," and the Michigan courts had also concluded that "certain causes of action belong to the rehabilitator alone." (Koken, supra, 803 A.2d at p. 822.)

In In re Silberstein (Pa.Commw.Ct. 2011) 11 A.3d 629, Stacey MacNeal requested electronic communications between citizens and commissioners serving on the township board.

The township produced writings in its possession and control, but it did not consider those made on computers maintained solely by a commissioner.

MacNeal argued that an elected official should not be permitted to shield public records relating to township activity by using a third party e-mail address on a personal computer.

MacNeal reasoned that public officials "are agency actors and are subject to York Township control." (Id. at p. 632.)

The trial court, however, ruled that those communications were not "public records" under Pennsylvania's "Right-to-Know Law" (RTKL).

The RTKL defines a public record as a nonexempt record of a commonwealth or local agency. (65 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 67.102.) A "record" is information, "regardless of physical form or characteristics, that documents a transaction or activity of an agency and that is created, received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of the agency... ." (Ibid.)

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that "a distinction must be made between transactions or activities of an agency which may be a 'public record' under the RTKL and the emails or documents of an individual public office holder. As pointed out by the trial court, Commissioner Silberstein is not a governmental entity. He is an individual public official with no authority to act alone on behalf of the Township. Consequently, emails and documents found on Commissioner Silberstein's personal computer would not fall within the definition of record, as any record personally and individually created by Commissioner Silberstein would not be a documentation of a transaction or activity of York Township, as the local agency, nor would the record have been created, received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of York Township. In other words, unless the emails and other documents in Commissioner Silberstein's possession were produced with the authority of York Township, as a local agency, or were later ratified, adopted or confirmed by York Township, said requested records cannot be deemed 'public records' within the meaning of the RTKL as the same are not 'of the local agency.'" (In re Silberstein, supra, 11 A.3d at p. 633.)

In Houston Estate (1952) 371 Pa. 396 89 A.2d 525, a testator's will provided that if his widow elected to take against his will, the couple's two sons would receive nothing. The widow did so elect, and the sons contested the provision in their father's will as void as against public policy. (Ibid.)

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected their arguments, holding:

"If a testator may disinherit his children, he may also condition their legacies so that the happening of a certain event will result in their disinheritance. Here, it is true, the widow was faced with the unfortunate choice of receiving a small legacy or causing the children to lose their bequests, but that, once again, is a question of the wisdom of the testator and not public policy." (Ibid.)

In Hammond v. Hammond (1917) 258 Pa. 51 101 A. 855, a ford had been used for over 21 years to access the dominant tenement. (Id. at p. 54.)

However, because in times of high water it was difficult, and occasionally impossible, to ford the creek, and because ice in the creek occasionally made the ford unsafe, the owner of the dominant tenement decided to build a bridge. (Ibid.)

When a flood occurred and the bridge increased the water that flooded the nearby residence of the servient tenant, the servient tenant sued the dominant tenant for trespass. (Id. at pp. 53, 55.)

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a judgment in favor of the defendant. As pertinent here, the court explained:

"The manifest intent of the grant was to afford the occupants of the dominant tenement a safe and convenient passage to the public road at all times, in wet weather as well as dry weather. We cannot impute to the grantor the intent of affording access to and from the dominant tenement only in times of low water. He might have limited the grant to the ford only but he did not. The words of a grant are to receive a reasonable construction in accord with the intention of the parties. The fact that the defendant did not proceed immediately to build the bridge does not prove that the parties construed the grant as precluding him from that right; and the fact that there was then no bridge at that point is not controlling; neither is the fact that for 21 years thereafter defendant and his family managed to exist there without a bridge. As defendant had possession of the private road during all that time, he lost no right by failing to improve it. A grant is to be construed in favor of the grantee, and includes whatever is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the thing granted. . . . The grantee of the free and uninterrupted use of a private road may improve it in such manner as to make it fit for the purpose expressed in the grant, and in so doing may construct a bridge over a ravine or creek, if it be done in such way as to cause the least practicable damage to the owner of the servient tenement . . . ." (Hammond v. Hammond, supra, 258 Pa. at pp. 55-56.)

In Foster v. Peat Marwick Main & Co. (Pa.Cmwlth. 1991) 138 Pa. Commw. 147, 587 A.2d 382, the court concluded that state statutes authorized the Insurance Commissioner, as rehabilitator, -- on behalf of the insolvent insurer, its policyholders and creditors -- to pursue an action against the insurer's independent auditor for misrepresentation, breach of contract, and malpractice.

In rejecting the contention of the auditor that Pennsylvania law authorized the rehabilitator to bring actions only on behalf of the insurer, the court stated:

"Section 501 of Article V requires us to liberally construe the Article to effectuate its purpose, plainly stated therein, which is 'to protect the interests of insureds, creditors and the public generally.' 40 P.S. § 221.1(b) and (c). The Rehabilitator is thereby authorized to take action - including legal action - to insure the protection of policyholders, among others. Section 516(c), read in the context of the entire article and construed in pari materia with Section 501, does not limit the Rehabilitator to claims asserted by Mutual Fire's corporate body, as Peat Marwick would have us hold. On the contrary, the case law of other jurisdictions on which Peat Marwick relies suggests the opposite. Those authorities plainly recognize that a rehabilitator, in her capacity as a receiver, may assert injury common to shareholders and general creditors and enjoys the authority to recover estate assets to which they will eventually look for recovery." (Foster, supra, 587 A.2d at p. 385.)

"Section 516(c) of Article V, 40 P.S. § 221.16(c) states: If it appears to the rehabilitator that there has been criminal or tortuous conduct, or breach of any contractual or fiduciary obligation detrimental to the insurer by any officer, manager, agent, broker, employee, or other person, he may pursue all appropriate legal remedies on behalf of the insurer." (Foster, supra, 587 A.2d at p. 384.)

In Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole (1996) 449 Pa. Super. 142 673 A.2d 348 , the court held a school bus driver's molestation of children while driving them to and from school was not an injury "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use" of the buses.

The court explained that ". . . no causal connection exists between the operation of a school bus and the injuries suffered by its minor passengers who have been sexually molested by its driver." ( Id., at p. 158 673 A.2d at p. 356.)

In Dettra v. Kestner (1892) 147 Pa. 566 23 A. 889, officers of a mutual live stock company lied to a member at the time the member joined.

Thereafter, a receivership took control of the company. (Id. at p. 578 23 A. 889.)

When the receiver demanded the member pay an assessment, the member asserted the defense of fraudulent inducement. The member alleged he was induced to apply for, and accept, membership in the company by the fraudulent representations of the officers of the company about the entity's financial standing.

The member asserted he did not know of the fraud until the receiver sought collection of the assessment. (Ibid.)

Dettra held that the member could not avoid an assessment because "the rights of innocent third parties have intervened, and it is essential to their protection that a contract, otherwise vitiated by fraud, and therefore voidable, should be sustained, equity requires that it be upheld." (Id. at p. 579 23 A. at p. 890.)

By its reference to innocent third parties, the court was apparently referring to other members of the company.

In Com. v. Slaughter (1978) 482 Pa. 538 394 A.2d 453, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania confronted an almost identical problem.

There the trial court had committed error under Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, in denying defense counsel access to the juvenile records (if any) of a witness.

Rather than reverse outright, Slaughter ordered the following disposition:

'(The record does not even indicate whether or not Ragland, in fact, had a record of juvenile offenses, let alone whether that record, if it exists, would support appellant's claim of bias.) We therefore remand the matter to the trial court with instructions that appellant, through his counsel, be given access to Ragland's juvenile record. Counsel will then be able to argue to the trial court what, if any, use could have been made of that record had he been allowed to use it to cross-examine Ragland. If, in the court's opinion, its original refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Ragland on the basis of this juvenile record prevented appellant from presenting to the jury evidence regarding Ragland's possible bias, or other information which would bring the case within the requirements of Davis, supra, it shall vacate the judgment of sentence and order a new trial. If, on the other hand, Ragland has no juvenile record, or if in the court's opinion, appellant has failed to assert any facts which would bring the case within the rationale of Davis, supra, it shall affirm its original order. Either party may then file an appropriate appeal.' ( Com. v. Slaughter, supra, 482 Pa. 538 394 A.2d 453, 460.)

In Com. v. Loeper (1995) 541 Pa. 393 663 A.2d 669, the court held the prosecution's evidence of defendant's intoxication was too speculative because it was based on the officer's description of defendant's behavior, and the blood test taken several hours after he was driving was insufficient to trigger the statutory inference that his blood-alcohol level exceeded the legal limit when he was driving. (Id. at pp. 396-399.)

In Com. v. Gonzalez (1988) 519 Pa. 116 546 A.2d 26, the court held the expert's testimony was speculative because there was no evidence when defendant consumed his last drink, which undermined his opinion about what defendant's blood-alcohol content might have been when he was driving. (Id. at pp. 133-135.)

In Commonwealth v. Collington (1992) 419 Pa. Super. 538 615 A.2d 769, the defendant wrote a threatening letter to the victim.

It reached her after she testified and she forwarded it to the prosecution unopened.

This was held sufficient to support the defendant's conviction under a statute prohibiting attempts to intimidate witnesses to withhold testimony. (Id., 615 A.2d at p. 770.)

In Commonwealth Dept. of Transp. v. Hoover (1994) 161 Pa. Commw. 517 637 A.2d 721, a passenger grabbed the steering wheel and caused the vehicle to swerve toward a police cruiser. (Id., 637 A.2d at p. 722.)

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania found the passenger was in actual physical control of the vehicle: " 'the vehicle was clearly in motion, and the action of the defendant in grabbing the steering wheel and causing the vehicle to swerve toward the police cruiser gave the defendant physical control of the movement of the vehicle.' " (Id. at p. 723.)

The court noted that one did not have to sit in the driver's seat to be considered a driver of a vehicle. (Ibid.) " 'When a passenger in a vehicle chooses to engage in such foolish conduct as grabbing the steering wheel, ... that person is assuming actual physical control over the vehicle's movement.' " (Ibid.)

In American Seating Company v. City of Philadelphia (1969) 434 Pa. 370 256 A.2d 599, the court held that a municipality's "quasi-private" proprietary interest in a privately built sports complex was subject to a mechanic's lien. T

he Pennsylvania statute at issue in that case provided, much like section 3109, that " 'No lien shall be allowed for labor or materials furnished for a purely public purpose.' " (American Seating, supra, at p. 600.)

The court reasoned that this language did not preclude the possibility of imposing a mechanic's lien on public property, and that the court "must inquire and decide whether, apart from the Act, the case law of Pennsylvania precludes mechanics' lien claims against municipalities." (Id. at p. 601.)

The court concluded:

"Although our research has disclosed no case explicitly holding that in every instance liens against municipal properties are void, still the statement seems correct as a general proposition of Pennsylvania law. However, it seems to us that a meaningful ground for distinction rests in the use to which the municipality puts the property. Where, as here, the municipality acts as an absent landlord, entrusting the management and control of its premises to its tenant; and where the building was constructed and paid for by the tenant; and further, where the municipality in owning the building, discharges a function not governmental in nature, but rather proprietary and quasi-private; then an exception to the general rule that municipal property is exempt from mechanics' liens seems proper. Since an execution upon the lien would not disrupt an essential public service or function, no reason appears for striking the lien down." (Ibid.)

In reaching this conclusion, the Pennsylvania court relied on cases upholding execution upon a judgment lien against public property held in a proprietary rather than governmental capacity. (American Seating, supra, 256 A.2d at p. 601, fn. 2, citing Kerr v. City of New Orleans (5th Cir. 1903) 126 F. 920; City of Bradenton v. Fusillo (1938) 134 Fla. 759 184 So. 234; City of Hazard v. Duff (1941) 287 Ky. 427 154 S.W.2d 28.)

In State v. Kessler (1980) 289 Or. 359 614 P.2d 94, the police found two billy clubs in the defendant's home at the time of his arrest. The Oregon Constitution provides:

"The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power." (Or. Const., art. I, § 27; see Kessler, supra, 614 P.2d at p. 95.) The statute in question prohibited possession of " 'an instrument or weapon commonly known as a blackjack, slung shot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, sap glove or metal knuckles ... .' " (Id. at fn. 1.)

The court noted that decisions construing the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution were "not particularly helpful because the wording of the Second Amendment differs substantially from Oregon's state provision." (614 P.2d at p. 95.)

The court then reviewed the history of the state's guarantee of the right to bear arms, and agreed with the defendant's contention that his conviction for possession of a billy club violated "his right to possess arms in his home for personal defense," concluding that the drafters of the Oregon constitutional provision intended " 'arms' " to include the hand-carried weapons commonly used by individuals for personal defense, that clubs were still used as personal weapons, and that therefore the "defendant's possession of a billy club in his home is protected by ... the Oregon Constitution." (Id. at pp. 95-100.)

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