In Brooks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Huntsville, 414 So. 2d 917, 920 (Ala. 1982) the Court stated the test for compulsory counterclaims: "A counterclaim is compulsory if it 'arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.' [Ala. R. Civ. P.] 13(a). Several tests are used by the courts to determine whether the claim arose from the same transaction or occurrence. "(1) The issues of fact and law raised by the claim and the counterclaim are the same. "(2) Res judicata--would a subsequent suit on the claim be barred absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? "(3) Substantially the same evidence will support or refute the claim and the counterclaim. "(4) There is a logical relationship between the claim and the counterclaim. "See Lyons, Alabama Practice, 13.6 (1973), 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure, 1410 (1971). "While this Court has never specifically adopted a test for determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory, the Committee Comments indicate that it was the intent of the drafters of the rules to adopt the 'logical relationship' test. The Committee Comments to Rule 13 state that '[a] counterclaim is compulsory if there is any logical relation of any sort between the original claim and the counterclaim.' "The Court of Civil Appeals adopted the logical relationship test in O'Donohue v. Citizens Bank, 350 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977). The logical relationship test denominates a counterclaim as compulsory if (1) its trial in the original action would avoid a substantial duplication of effort or (2) the original claim and the counterclaim arose out of the same aggregate core of operative facts. The claims arise from the same core of operative facts if (1) the facts taken as a whole serve as the basis for both claims or (2) the sum total of facts upon which the original claim rests creates legal rights in a party which would otherwise remain dormant. Id., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970)." Brooks, 414 So. 2d at 919.