In Shockey v. Industrial Commission 140 Ariz. 113, 117, 680 P.2d 823, 827 (App. 1983), the Decision on Review was issued sixty-seven days after the request, and Shockey argued that the decision was void because it was untimely pursuant 23-943(G). 140 Ariz. at 116, 680 P.2d at 826. In deciding that the sixty-day requirement was only directive, the Court relied on Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926), where our supreme court considered whether the sixty-day time limit imposed on superior court judges by Article 6, Section 15, of the Arizona Constitution, was jurisdictional. The court held that the constitutional provision was not jurisdictional and stated: If the judgment, when rendered, is to be declared void, then the litigants, who have already been subjected to an unconstitutional delay must again be subjected to the additional delays necessary to again bring the cause to the condition it was before the court violated its sworn duty. They must also pay the accruing costs necessary for that purpose. Were the delay something within the control of the litigant, were it caused by his own dereliction, the conclusion contended for might be tolerated. But the litigant cannot control the action of the court after he has submitted his cause for its decision. . . . To punish the litigant for the wrongs of the court which he has no power to prevent, is not, we repeat, the purpose of this constitutional provision, and to so hold would be subversive of its intent. Williams, 29 Ariz. at 543, 243 P. at 403 (quoting Demaris v. Barker, 33 Wash. 200, 74 P. 362, 363 (Wash. 1903)). The Court found that the same concerns expressed in Williams applied to workers' compensation case decisions. Shockey, 140 Ariz. at 117, 680 P.2d at 827.