Delivering Drugs During Probation of Suspended Sentence
In revoking appellant's suspended imposition of sentences for two counts of possession of cocaine, the trial court found that X had violated the conditions of her suspension by delivering cocaine to a confidential informant.
The trial court sentenced appellant to serve ten years imprisonment with five years suspended. the only argument appellant makes on appeal is that the trial court erred in not suppressing the testimony of a police officer that had been tainted by an unconstitutional lineup.
Officer X testified that, during an undercover operation on January 22, 1998, around 3:00 in the afternoon, he saw appellant make a hand-to-hand drug buy with a confidential informant.
The informant bought sixty dollars worth of crack cocaine from appellant. the officer stated that he observed appellant through the rear-view window of his car while sitting directly in front of the transaction.
Officer X also indicated that he recognized appellant in a single photograph he had been shown the same day or the following day at the police station.
appellant's mother, testified that she had been taking appellant to work her shift from 3:30 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. during January 1998. She estimated that it took her twenty to twenty-five minutes to get to work and that the street where the transaction took place was approximately a mile or a half mile from her house.
a supervisor at appellant's place of employment, testified that her records indicated that appellant had been at work on the day in question.
Appellant argues that the in-court identification of her was tainted by a suggestive lineup since officer X was shown only one picture at the police station.
She argues that she was denied due process because the identification of her was unreliable. to demonstrate the unreliability, appellant cites the factors enumerated in Wooten v. State, 325 Ark. 510, 931 S.W.2d 408 (1996).
Appellant points to the officer's limited observation being a car length away from the transaction and because the guilty party never exited the vehicle.
Appellant argues that the officer's description in his police report was inaccurate as to what side of the vehicle the guilty party sat on and was generic in that the party was simply referred to as a black female.
Appellant also notes that the in-court identification took place fourteen months after the transaction had been observed.
Although in a revocation hearing a defendant is not entitled to the full panoply of rights that attend a criminal prosecution, he is entitled to due process. Hill v. State, 65 Ark. App. 131, 985 S.W.2d 342 (1999).
Because due process is a flexible concept, each particular situation must be examined in order to determine what procedures are constitutionally required. Caswell v. State, 63 Ark. App. 59, 973 S.W.2d 832 (1998).
Reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Hayes v. State, 311 Ark. 645, 846 S.W.2d 182 (1993).
We will not reverse a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of an in-court identification unless that ruling is clearly erroneous under the totality of the circumstances. Dixon v. State, 310 Ark. 460, 839 S.W.2d 173 (1992).
Here, Officer X stated that there was no doubt in his mind as to appellant's identity and that he was identifying her based on his observation of her during the transaction and not on the photograph.
Officer X had an optimal view of appellant during the hand-to-hand transaction.
Because so little time had passed between Officer X's observing the transaction and viewing the photograph, we cannot conclude that the officer's in-court identification of appellant was tainted from being shown only one photograph.
The trial court's ruling is not clearly erroneous.