In Mazepink v. State (1999) 336 Ark. 171 987 S.W.2d 648, the Arkansas Supreme Court held squarely in reliance on Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927 and the United States Supreme Court's prior definition of "legitimate expectation of privacy" (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128), that a defendant who was absent when the police searched his residence nevertheless had the requisite privacy interest to raise a knock-notice claim. The Mazepink court first quoted the Rakas discussion of what constitutes a legitimate expectation of privacy: " 'Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, . . . and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.' " (Mazepink, supra, 987 S.W.2d at p. 651, quoting Rakas, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 143.) The court then reasoned that in light of Rakas the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his residence regardless of whether he was there when the police arrived: "It seems irrelevant under these circumstances that Mazepink was not actually present at the time of entry; his standing to seek exclusion of the evidence obtained after the search is grounded in his right to exclude others and to be free from illegal police invasion of his privacy in his residence. Furthermore, Mazepink's legitimate expectation of privacy in his residence encompasses the right to expect not only privacy for himself, but for his family and invitees, including the persons who were present at the time of entry." (Mazepink, supra, 987 S.W.2d at p. 652.) The court also noted that on the facts of the case the "destruction of property" factor described in Wilson gave the defendant an additional claim to standing because the police had forced entry into his house, damaging the property. (Mazepink, supra, 987 S.W.2d at pp. 651-652.) The court concluded that because "at least one person was present to comply with the officers' request for entry so that they could execute their search warrant," "it seems irrelevant ... that Mazepink was not actually present at the time of entry; his standing to seek exclusion of the evidence obtained after the search is grounded in his right to exclude others and to be free from illegal police invasion of his privacy in his residence. Furthermore, Mazepink's legitimate expectation of privacy in his residence encompasses the right to expect not only privacy for himself, but for his family and invitees, including his live-in girlfriend ... and her daughter." ( Id. at p. 652.) Thus, the Mazepink court concluded that the defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy for himself and for his family and invitees in his home gave him the right to assert that a knock-notice violation that occurred in his absence violated his Fourth Amendment rights. In support of its conclusion, the Mazepink court cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Alderman v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 165. ( Mazepink v. State, supra, 987 S.W.2d at p. 652.)