In Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, the court considered whether the litigation privilege preempted part of the Santa Monica tenant harassment ordinance that authorized civil and criminal penalties against a landlord who maliciously took action against a tenant without a reasonable factual or legal basis. (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1238-1239 & fn. 1.) The Supreme Court concluded that a provision that allowed "actions alleging that a landlord had improperly filed an action to recover possession of rental housing," was preempted because it was "inimical to the important purposes of the litigation privilege" and "would severely restrict landlords' freedom of access to the courts." (Id. at p. 1243.) The court observed that "An action brought pursuant to this provision of the ordinance is necessarily based on the filing of a legal action, which by its very nature is a communicative act." (Id. at p. 1249.) But the court also concluded that a part of the ordinance that permitted suits based on the service of eviction notices was not entirely preempted, because "a prelitigation communication is privileged only when it relates to litigation that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration," and the determination of that question requires a factual inquiry. (Id. at pp. 1251-1252.) "The litigation privilege, codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a 'publication or broadcast' made as part of a 'judicial proceeding' is privileged. This privilege is absolute in nature, applying 'to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.' 'The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication: (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; (4) that has some connection or logical relation to the action.' The privilege 'is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.' 'The principal purpose of the litigation privilege is to afford litigants and witnesses citation the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.' " (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1241.) "A threshold issue in determining if the litigation privilege applies is whether the alleged injury arises from a communicative act or noncommunicative conduct." (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1248.) " 'As a general rule, the privilege " 'applies only to communicative acts and does not privilege tortious courses of conduct.' " (Id. at p. 1249.) The California Supreme Court considered whether the litigation privilege applied to another Santa Monica rent-control-related ordinance. At issue was Santa Monica Municipal Code section 4.56.020, subdivision (i)(1), which prohibits landlords from maliciously serving a notice of eviction or bringing any action to recover possession of a rental unit without a reasonable factual or legal basis. The disputed provision prohibits landlords from taking any "action to terminate any tenancy including service of any notice to quit or other eviction notice or bring any action to recover possession of a rental housing unit based upon facts which the landlord has no reasonable cause to believe to be true or upon a legal theory which is untenable under the facts known to the landlord." (Ibid.) Because an unlawful detainer action falls squarely within the litigation privilege, the court held the ordinance was preempted by section 47, subdivision (b) to the extent it applied to the maintenance of such an action. (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1243-1250.) While a notice of eviction may well have been sufficiently connected to an unlawful detainer action to qualify for the litigation privilege, the court held this was not necessarily so. Instead, the notice presented a factual question as to whether the prelitigation communication relates to litigation that was contemplated in good faith and was under serious consideration. Action Apartment thus holds that the litigation privilege may preempt some but not all local ordinances regulating bad faith eviction notices or other prelitigation conduct. (Id. at pp. 1251-1252.) The Court observed that it had frequently recognized "exceptions to the litigation privilege based on irreconcilable conflicts between the privilege and other coequal state laws." (Id. at p. 1247.) The court explained the underlying principle as follows: "Our recognition of these exceptions . . . has been guided by the 'rule of statutory construction that particular provisions will prevail over general provisions.' Each of the above mentioned statutes is more specific than the litigation privilege and would be significantly or wholly inoperable if its enforcement were barred when in conflict with the privilege." (Id. at p. 1246.)