In Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1324, an attorney's previous law firm advised a manufacturer about the disposal of toxic waste at a particular site. The attorney, Hackard, did not personally advise the manufacturer about that issue or any other issue. Nine years after leaving the firm, Hackard represented plaintiffs against the manufacturer in a case arising from its alleged wrongful disposal of toxic waste at the site. The court held that the "imputed knowledge doctrine," that is, the doctrine that a lawyer's knowledge of confidential information is imputed to other attorneys in his or her firm, does not work in reverse. In other words, the firm's knowledge could not be imputed to Hackard so that he was automatically disqualified from representing plaintiffs suing the manufacturer even after he left the firm. (Id. at p. 1333.) In sum, law firm No. 1 represented the defendant. A partner in that firm, who had performed no work for the defendant, moved to law firm No. 2. Once there, that attorney represented the plaintiffs on substantially related litigation. The court held that the attorney was not necessarily disqualified. ( Id. at p. 1341.) It stressed that "both rule 3-310(E) of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct and Business and Professions Code section 6068 . . . presuppose that attorney-client confidences are acquired by individual attorneys, not by law firms in general." ( Id. at p. 1334.) The court concluded "that disqualification should not be ordered where there is no reasonable probability the firm-switching attorney had access to confidential information while at his or her former firm that is related to the current representation." ( Id. at p. 1340.) The Adams court enunciated this standard: "Where there is a substantial relationship between the current case and the matters handled by the firm-switching attorney's former firm, but the attorney did not personally represent the former client who now seeks to remove him from the case, the trial court should apply a modified version of the 'substantial relationship' test . . . . The court's task, under these circumstances, is to determine whether confidential information material to the current representation would normally have been imparted to the attorney during his tenure at the old firm." ( Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp., supra, 86 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1340.) The court further expounded: "In answering this question, the court should focus on the relationship, if any, between the attorney and the former client's representation. It should consider any time spent by the attorney working on behalf of the former client and 'the attorney's possible exposure to formulation of policy or strategy' in matters relating to the current dispute. The court should also take into account whether the attorney worked out of the same branch office that handled the former litigation, and/or whether his administrative or management duties may have placed him in a position where he would have been exposed to matters relevant to the current dispute." ( Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp., supra, 86 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1340.)