Section 22 states the basic principle of law recognized in California that a criminal act is not rendered less criminal because it is committed by a person in a state of voluntary intoxication. Evidence of voluntary intoxication is not admissible to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged. However, evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible with respect to the actual formation of a required specific intent. ( 22.) In addressing defendant's claim, it is useful to examine the history of the latter amendments to section 22, as explained by the California Supreme Court in People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 1114, 1124-1126 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 428, 959 P.2d 735: "In 1982, the Legislature amended section 22 to provide, as relevant: '(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. " '(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.' (Stats. 1982, ch. 893, 2, pp. 3317-3318.) The Legislature stated that the 1982 amendment was 'declaratory of existing law.' (Stats. 1982, ch. 893, 5, p. 3318.) "Most recently, in 1995, effective January 1, 1996, the Legislature amended section 22 to provide, as relevant: '(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in that condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. " '(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.' (Stats. 1995, ch. 793, 1; see People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 1009, 1014, fn. 1 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197.) "In People v.Whitfield (1994), we concluded 'that section 22 was not intended, in murder prosecutions, to preclude consideration of evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue whether a defendant harbored malice aforethought, whether the prosecution proceeds on a theory that malice was express or implied.' (People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 437, 451 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858, 868 P.2d 272.) Justice Mosk, joined by Chief Justice Lucas and, in a separate opinion, Justice Baxter, would have found voluntary intoxication not admissible to negate implied malice. (Id. at pp. 456-477 (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); id. at p. 477 (conc. and dis. opn. of Baxter, J.).) The most recent amendment to section 22 came in apparent reaction to this holding. the Legislative Counsel's Digest to the bill amending section 22 stated: 'Under existing law, as held by the California Supreme Court in People v. Whitfield, 7 Cal. 4th 437, the phrase "when a specific intent crime is charged" includes murder even where the prosecution relies on a theory of implied malice. This bill would provide, instead, that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.' (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 121 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.).)" (18 Cal. 4th at pp. 1124-1126.)