In the absence of a request, a trial court generally has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction. Under section 355, "when evidence is admissible . . . for one purpose and is inadmissible . . . for another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." (Italics added.) Under this provision, a court has no duty to give a sua sponte instruction limiting the purpose for which evidence may be considered. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 468, 533 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035; People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 739, 746, fn. 3 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 941 P.2d 838; People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal. 3d 43, 63-64 177 Cal. Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534, 23 A.L.R.4th 776.) This principle has been held specifically to apply to limiting instructions regarding the admission of a defendant's previous uncharged misconduct. (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 891, 950-951 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 906 P.2d 388, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 800, 823 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) We conclude it applies as well to a limiting instruction on the use of evidence admitted under section 1109. (Cf. Brown, supra, 77 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1336-1337