In Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, the plaintiffs, a class of employees, sued their employer for failure to pay wages in accordance with a contract between the employer and the City of Hayward requiring the payment of a "living wage." The court found the employee plaintiffs were intended third party beneficiaries of the contract, because the living wage requirement was clearly intended to benefit them. (Id. at pp. 1193-1194.) In Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, it was claimed that the employer had failed to comply with a living wage ordinance. The employer raised in defense constitutional challenges to the ordinance. Although those defenses were rejected, they were neither unreasonable nor frivolous (id. at p. 1202) and therefore the employer was not liable for the penalty. "So long as no other evidence suggests the employer acted in bad faith, presentation of a good faith defense, based in law or fact, will negate a finding of willfulness." (Id. at p. 1204.) The Court construed similar language addressing an "initial" violation and a "subsequent" violation in a Labor Code provision imposing civil penalties. (Id. at pp. 1207-1209.) The statutory language that an "initial violation is to be imposed 'for each failure to pay each employee,'" contemplates that an "initial" violation can result in multiple penalties at the $50 level. (Id. at p. 1209.) This could only occur if the penalties were assessed at each pay period. (Ibid.) Since the statutory language "contemplates the imposition of repeated penalties for each pay period that an initial violation continues, a 'subsequent' violation (which carries a double penalty) must refer to something other than an underpayment that occurs after the first pay period." (Ibid.) A subsequent violation occurs after the employer has been notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision. "Until the employer has been notified that it is violating a Labor Code provision (whether or not the commissioner or court chooses to impose penalties), the employer cannot be presumed to be aware that its continuing underpayment of employees is a 'violation' subject to penalties." (Ibid.) After the employer has notice, any future or subsequent violations would be punished at twice the rate of the initial violation. (Ibid.) In Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, the plaintiff initially sued an employer for violation of certain wage and hour laws, and subsequently amended to add a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. (Lab. Code, 2698 et seq.) As the Amaral court stated: "'The prevailing rule with respect to actions involving parties designated by their true names in the original complaint is that, if an amendment is sought after the statute of limitations has run, the amended complaint will be deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint provided recovery is sought in both pleadings on the same general set of facts. ' Cases applying this relation back rule have made it clear that 'it is the sameness of the facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from those facts that is determinative. ' " (Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, supra, at p. 1199.) The trial court found that the employer, Cintas (a uniform supplier), violated a city living wage ordinance (LWO) by failing to pay wages at the rate required by the LWO to employees who performed work on the city's contracts outside the city. The trial court awarded unpaid wages but found that the existence of a good faith defense precluded imposition of waiting time penalties. (Amaral, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 1170-1171, 1173-1174.) The appellate court affirmed. The court explained, "the legal obligations imposed on employers by the LWO were unclear at the time of Cintas's violations. As Cintas's vigorous defense ... has made clear, numerous arguments exist concerning the constitutionality of the LWO and its proper interpretation. Before the trial court rulings in this case, no court had previously addressed the scope or the validity of the City's LWO. Living wage ordinances such as the one at issue here are a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, until now, ... no California appellate decision has construed the requirements of any ... living wage ordinance, or addressed the constitutional challenges ... that Cintas has raised. Although we have rejected Cintas's legal arguments about the LWO, these defenses were not unreasonable or frivolous. On the contrary, they raised complicated issues of first impression ... ." (Id. at p. 1202.) In addition, there was no evidence the employer knew it was required to compensate its production workers at the rates prescribed in the LWO, or showing the company acted in bad faith when it failed to pay such rates. (Ibid.) In Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, the appellate court upheld an attorney fees award in which a 1.65 multiplier was applied to the lodestar figure. The appellate court stated: "The defendant complains the court improperly based the multiplier on 'contingent risk' without evidence of 'comparative billing data (such as hours billed annually by the firm or amount of income deferred)' or without evidence that plaintiffs' attorneys 'sacrificed opportunities for other work' to represent the class. However, the defendant takes an unduly narrow view of the concept of 'contingent risk.' It is not simply that counsel turned away paid work for a time in order to represent that class, but that counsel risked never receiving compensation at all. The claims and defenses in this case raised a significant number of complex legal issues of first impression, and class counsel took a substantial risk that it would not prevail on these issues and thus would not recover a full fee. Our courts have recognized that an enhanced fee award is necessary to compensate attorneys for taking such risks: '"A contingent fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed. The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the loan of those services. . . ." "A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases." (Id. at pp. 1217-1218.)