In Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, a newspaper published a letter written by defendant in which she made allegedly defamatory comments about her former same-sex partner with regards to the high-profile child custody litigation in which they were involved. The trial court had already ruled in the underlying custody case, and the matter was pending in the appellate courts. In her letter, defendant stated plaintiff was "'a convicted perpetrator of domestic violence against defendant, and had made repeated false accusations of child abuse and neglect against her while actively litigating for sole custody of both children . . . .'" (Id. at p. 1158.) In Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004) two former domestic partners (Annette and Sharon) had been involved in a highly publicized litigation involving second-parent adoption. Annette sued Sharon for libel based on statements Sharon made in a letter to a newspaper calling Annette a "convicted perpetrator of domestic violence against me." (Id. at p. 1158.) To show she made the statement without malice, Sharon relied on undisputed evidence that the family court found Annette had committed domestic violence against her. (Id. at p. 1168.) Sharon also submitted her own declaration in which she stated that she had no legal training and did not consult with an attorney before she wrote the letter, and that she believed the statement to be true based on her "'understanding of the legal proceedings involving Annette's domestic violence against me.'" (Ibid.) On this record, this court found Annette failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits of the constitutional malice element of her libel claim. The Court reasoned that although the word "convicted" was not technically correct because there had been no criminal proceedings against Annette, Sharon's statements that, as a layperson, she believed this word accurately reflected the proceedings, was "not so implausible as to support an inference of actual malice." (Id. at p. 1168.) In Annette F. v. Sharon S. the statement at issue, made by Sharon S., was "'Annette, a convicted perpetrator of domestic violence against me, has made repeated false accusations of child abuse and neglect against me while actively litigating for sole custody of both children . . . .'" (Id. at p. 1158.) Annette initiated a libel action against Sharon based on this statement. In evaluating Sharon's anti-SLAPP motion, the Court of Appeal first determined that Annette's libel action arose from acts in furtherance of Sharon's right of free speech. The court further found that Annette was a limited purpose public figure, therefore the actual malice standard was applicable. The court then went on to analyze Sharon's statement that Annette was a convicted perpetrator of domestic violence, when in fact Annette had never been convicted of any crime. The court quoted New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, which explained that the actual malice standard is "based on a recognition that 'erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate' and 'must be protected' to give freedom of expression the 'breathing space' it needs to survive. Citation." (Annette F., supra, at p. 1168.) The court interpreted Sharon's statement that Annette was a convicted perpetrator of domestic violence to refer to a family court finding that Annette had committed domestic violence against Sharon. (Ibid.) Annette introduced no evidence to contradict Sharon's declaration as to her belief in the truth of the allegedly defamatory statement, thus Annette failed to carry her burden on the issue of actual malice. (Id. at p. 1169.) The court emphasized that "actual malice may not be inferred solely from evidence of personal spite, ill will, or bad motive. Citation." (Ibid.) The court further explained, "A critical consideration in determining the weight to be given such factors is the extent to which the allegedly defamatory statement deviates from the truth. False statements that are completely 'fabricated by the defendant' or 'so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation' are particularly likely to have been made with actual malice. . . . "On the other hand, false statements that have some element of truth to them are logically less susceptible to such a finding." (Annette F., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1169-1170.) Sharon's statement that Annette was a convicted perpetrator of domestic violence was not so far from the truth as to permit an inference of actual malice. The court was left with a "speculative possibility that Sharon might have known or suspected that her use of the word 'convicted' was technically incorrect." Such a speculative possibility fell short of clear and convincing evidence. (Annette F., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1170.) The court held the libel action was subject to a special motion to strike because defendant's statements were in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body. Plaintiff's "alleged domestic violence against defendant and the allegations of abuse and neglect by defendant were at issue in the pending custody and appellate proceedings . . . ." (Id. at p. 1161.)