What Is an Arbuckle Waiver in California ? In People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, the California Supreme Court established the rule that when a defendant accepts a plea bargain with the reasonable expectation that the judge who took the plea will also be the sentencing judge, the right to the same judge is a significant term of the bargain that must be adhered to at sentencing. (Id. at pp. 756-757) As explained in Arbuckle, "whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge. Because of the range of dispositions available to a sentencing judge, the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea." (People v. Arbuckle, supra, at pp. 756-757.) The Arbuckle court recognized, however, that there are situations where it is not possible for the same judge to preside at sentencing. When the judge is not available, the Arbuckle court stated that the defendant "must be given the option of proceeding before the different judge available or of withdrawing his plea." (People v. Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 757, & fn. 5.) The California Supreme Court specifically dealt with a situation in which "internal court administrative practices" made it impossible or impracticable for the judge who accepted the defendant's plea to impose sentence. (Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 757.) In Arbuckle, the defendant argued that a term of his plea agreement was violated because he was sentenced by a different judge from the judge who took his plea. (Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 753.) Because of delays caused by motions and a writ petition brought by the defendant himself in relation to the sentencing, by the time of the sentencing hearing the judge who took the defendant's plea had been reassigned to a different department. (Ibid.) The defendant claimed that sentencing by the same judge was an implied term of his plea agreement that he had the right to specifically enforce. (Id. at pp. 756-757.) The Supreme Court, in a relatively brief discussion, agreed that the change of the sentencing judge violated an implied term of the plea agreement and that the defendant was entitled to a remedy. (Ibid.) First, the court held that "the plea bargain herein was entered in expectation of and in reliance upon sentence being imposed by the same judge." (Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 756.) As factual support for this finding, the court cited "the judge's repeated use of the personal pronoun when referring to sentencing in the proceeding in which the plea bargain was accepted." (Ibid.) The court added, "As a general principle, moreover, whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge. Because of the range of dispositions available to a sentencing judge, the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea." (Id. at pp. 756-757.) Second, the court held that the defendant had the right to enforce this "inherently significant" term of the plea agreement: "The defendant is entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea, or if internal court administrative practices render that impossible, then in the alternative defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea." (Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 757.) In a footnote, the court added, "We recognize that in multi-judge courts, a judge hearing criminal cases one month may be assigned to other departments in subsequent months. However a defendant's reasonable expectation of having his sentence imposed, pursuant to bargain and guilty plea, by the judge who took his plea and ordered sentence reports should not be thwarted for mere administrative convenience. If the original judge is not available for sentencing purposes after a plea bargain, the defendant must be given the option of proceeding before the different judge available or of withdrawing his plea." (Id. at p. 757, fn. 5.) In Arbuckle, the sentencing issues included whether and where the defendant would be confined after receipt of a report from the Department of Corrections. (Arbuckle, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 752.) The sentencing judge was unavailable only for reasons of "administrative convenience" that were within the court's control. (Id. at p. 757, fn. 5.) It was in that context that the Supreme Court articulated the "general principle" that "whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge." (Id. at pp. 756-757.) It also was in that context that the court held, "Because of the range of dispositions available to a sentencing judge, the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea," and the defendant must be permitted to either enforce the term or withdraw his plea if the term was violated. (Id. at p. 757, italics added.)