Spontaneous declarations have been admitted which involve the same or substantially longer periods of time. ( In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 Cal. App. 4th 1695 [12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294] [one to two days]; People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal. 3d 306 (30 mins.); People v. Hughey (1987) 194 Cal. App. 3d 1383 [240 Cal. Rptr. 269] [three to four mins.].) In Jefferson, California Evidence Benchbook, it is stated: "A statement need not be contemporaneous with the act observed in order to be a spontaneous statement. The length of time between the act observed and the declarant's statement, whether it be several minutes or an hour, is simply a factor to be considered by the trial judge in making a determination of whether the declarant's statement was made spontaneously and under the stress of excitement caused by the event. A statement made long after an observed act should generally be excluded because the declarant would no longer be under stress of excitement from the act observed. But if the elapsed time is accounted for by shock, unconsciousness, or fear, belated statements may still be admissible as spontaneous statements made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement. People v. Farmer (1989) 47 C3d 888, 904, 254 CR 508 [765 P.2d 940]." (1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 1999) 13.5, p. 201.) Although the length of time between the act observed and the declarant's statement is only a factor to be considered, it is "an important factor because a spontaneous statement must be made under the immediate influence of the event so as to negate any probability of reflection or fabrication." (People v. Garcia (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 814, 820 [224 Cal. Rptr. 198].)