In Asgari v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 15 Cal. 4th 744, Asgari was arrested and charged with the sale of narcotics. He remained in jail for more than seven months, until he was acquitted following a jury trial. He sued the arresting officers and the city which employed them for false arrest and related causes of action and was awarded damages for the injuries arising from the entire period of his incarceration. The Supreme Court reviewed the judgment to decide "whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a police officer's liability for false arrest may include damages sustained by the arrestee after the filing of formal charges." (15 Cal. 4th at p. 748.) The court held that while such damages are allowed in a section 1983 action, citing Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, they "do not reflect the applicable California law, and . . . the jury should have been instructed that the immunity from liability for injury caused by malicious prosecution, provided to public employees by Government Code section 821.6, precludes a plaintiff in a false arrest action from recovering damages that are attributable to the period of the plaintiff's incarceration that follows his or her arraignment on criminal charges." ( Asgari, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at p. 748.) Relying heavily on the analysis in Jackson v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. App. 3d 579, the Supreme Court explained: "As recognized by the Court of Appeal in Jackson, the Legislature's imposition of liability when a police officer causes a suspect to be confined unlawfully (false arrest), coupled with the Legislature's grant of absolute immunity when a police officer, maliciously and without probable cause, causes a suspect to be confined through the initiation of lawful process (malicious prosecution), evidences a legislative intent to shield police officers from liability for damages that are attributable to a suspect's incarceration after the institution of lawful process. It follows that a police officer's liability for false arrest does not include damages caused by incarceration following the arrestee's arraignment on formal charges." ( Asgari, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at p. 758.) The court further explained it was departing from the more liberal rule in Gill v. Epstein because "the events . . . in Gill occurred before the enactment of the California Tort Claims Act of 1963, and the decision in that case therefore did not consider the effect of sections 820.4 and 821.6 or discuss the effect that immunity for malicious prosecution should have on the scope of the damages properly recoverable in an action for false arrest." ( Asgari, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at p. 758, fn. 10.) Applying the false imprisonment/malicious prosecution distinction to Asgari's situation the court held: "Plaintiff's false imprisonment ended when he was arraigned in municipal court on the felony complaint seven days after he was arrested. At that point, plaintiff's confinement was pursuant to lawful process and no longer constituted false imprisonment." ( Asgari, supra, 15 Cal. 4th at p. 757.) The California Supreme Court held the plaintiff could not recover damages for false arrest for injuries incurred after the arraignment on criminal charges because the arraignment constituted lawful process. (Id. at pp. 748, 757.) After arraignment, the plaintiff's injuries were the result of malicious prosecution, for which the public entity defendants enjoyed complete immunity. (Ibid.) In Asgari, the plaintiff was arrested without an arrest warrant. The arrest therefore was made without lawful process and the plaintiff's injuries flowing from the arrest to the time of arraignment were the product of false arrest. (Id. at p. 751.) The California Supreme Court explained: "The Legislature's imposition of liability when a police officer causes a suspect to be confined unlawfully (false arrest), coupled with the Legislature's grant of absolute immunity when a police officer, maliciously and without probable cause, causes a suspect to be confined through the initiation of lawful process (malicious prosecution), evidences a legislative intent to shield police officers from liability for damages that are attributable to a suspect's incarceration after the institution of lawful process." (Asgari, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 758.)