In Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 650, the sole issue on appeal was whether the primary assumption of risk doctrine applied to the annual Burning Man Festival at which attendees are encouraged to engage in the ritual of depositing an item in the flames. The plaintiff, who was severely burned when he did so, argued that the doctrine applied only to " 'rule-based' sports or, or at a minimum, to 'active sports.' " (Id. at p. 658.) The appellate court disagreed. It reasoned that, although Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 involved a touch football game, the opinion made reference to other applications of the rule to obviously dangerous activities, like firefighting. The court found that "the risk of injury to those who voluntarily decide to partake in the commemorative ritual at Burning Man is self-evident. ... The risk of stumbling on buried fire debris ... was an obvious and inherent one." (Id. at pp. 658-659.) The court concluded that the doctrine applied to activities like the Burning Man Festival which involve "inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants ... where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity. " (Id. at p. 658.) In Beninati, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at page 661, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant increased the risk of harm by failing to adequately supervise the Burning Man Festival site, noting that there was no "expert testimony or other evidence raising even a reasonable inference that any action or inaction by Black Rock increased the risk of harm to Beninati, or that such risk could have been mitigated without altering the nature of the ritualistic Burning Man event in which Beninati was participating." (Ibid.) In Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC (2009) the activity centered on the plaintiff's attendance at the Burning Man festival in which large throngs congregate annually in the desert to witness the burning of a 60-foot combustible sculpture of a man, which is held upright by wire cables. (Beninati, at pp. 658-659.) The plaintiff apparently tripped over the wire cables and was himself burned. (Id. at p. 655.) The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that because the activity was not a sport, the primary assumption of risk doctrine was inapplicable to bar the claim. (Id. at pp. 658-659.) It held that "the risk of injury to those who voluntarily decide to partake in the commemorative ritual at Burning Man is self-evident. ... Once much of the material had burned, and the conflagration had subsided but was still actively burning, ... the risk of stumbling on buried fire debris, including the cables ... , was an obvious and inherent one. Thus, the risk of falling and being burned by the flames or hot ash was inherent, obvious, and necessary to the event, and the plaintiff assumed such risk." (Ibid.) The Court held the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred the claims of a plaintiff who tripped and fell into a fire pit while participating in a ritual at the Burning Man festival. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the doctrine applied only to rule-based or active sports, holding: "Although Knight involved injuries occurring during a game of touch football, it is clear from the opinion that the doctrine applies not only to sports, but to other activities involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants like plaintiff, where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity." (Ibid.) The Court analogized plaintiff's case to those that have applied the " ' "firefighter's rule," ' " which provides that "one who sets a fire owes no duty of care to a firefighter injured while engaged in fire suppression activities." (Beninati, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 658.) It stated that although the plaintiff was not a firefighter, the primary assumption of risk doctrine applied because "the risk of falling and being burned by the flames or hot ash by walking into an area where a large sculpture had just been burned was inherent, obvious, and necessary to the event" and he had "deliberately, and with awareness of specific risks inherent in the activity, nonetheless chosen to engage in the activity." (Id. at pp. 658-659.)