In Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, the plaintiff prevailed in her Song-Beverly Act claim concerning a defective automobile and was awarded loss of use damages measured by what it would have cost her to rent a replacement vehicle. (Bishop, at pp. 754-756.) Bishop struck the portion of the award that was based on loss of use, concluding that the plaintiff was "not entitled to 'loss of use' damages not actually incurred." (Bishop, at p. 758.) In reaching this conclusion, Bishop acknowledged that Commercial Code section 2715 controls whether loss of use damages are available under the Song-Beverly Act absent an actual monetary loss. (Bishop, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.) Concluding that Commercial Code section 2715's "reference to losses must be construed and applied in the context of monetary losses actually incurred" (id. at p. 756), Bishop relied on three main factors. The first factor was the legislative history of Commercial Code section 2715 and the case law applying it. With respect to the legislative history, Bishop noted that the concept of consequential damages had been significantly narrowed in Commercial Code section 2715, " 'refusing to permit recovery unless the buyer could not reasonably have prevented the loss by cover or otherwise' " and " 'modifying the rule by requiring first that the buyer attempt to minimize his damages in good faith, either by cover or otherwise.' " (Bishop, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 756.) With respect to case law, Bishop stated that "the only decisions applying Commercial Code section 2715, other than those relating to injury to person or property, are those which relate to commercial transactions in which there were lost profits because of buyers' inability to resell or otherwise commercially use property of which the sellers' breach deprived them. There is no such issue in this case." (Bishop, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 756.) Bishop also noted that the plaintiff cited "no cases in which consequential damages as defined in the California Uniform Commercial Code section 2715 have been determined to include noncommercial situations involving 'loss of use' of personal vehicles." (Bishop, at p. 756.) Bishop explained, "The commentary following California Uniform Commercial Code section 2715 discusses the legislative intent regarding the type of consequential damages available . . . . Examples of consequential damages recoverable under prior California law are the recovery of lost resale profits contemplated at the time of the contract, and recovery of damages for time and money spent in efforts to make goods conform to warranty under which they were sold. The purposes, changes and new material added at the time California Uniform Commercial Code section 2715 was enacted in 1963, show the consequential damage provision was legislatively limited by this enactment." (Bishop, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at pp. 755-756.) Second, Bishop relied on Kwan, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 174, which held that damages for emotional distress are not available under the Song-Beverly Act. Bishop concluded that loss of use damages were not available without an actual monetary expense because "claim for damages for 'loss of use' expenses not actually incurred is akin to one for aggravation or distress, similar to that rejected in Kwan" (Bishop, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at pp. 756-757) and is a remedy "drawn from the law of torts" rather than from the law of contract. (Id. at p. 757.) The Court interpreted the phrase "including, but not limited to" as it appears in the context of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(B). In so doing, the court stated: "Civil Code Section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2)(B) refers to incidental damages to which the buyers are entitled under Civil Code section 1794, including, but not limited to rental car costs actually incurred by the buyer. Bishop would have us disregard the reference to 'actually incurred' or construe it as having no substantive meaning in the context of the kinds of damages available. She stresses the phrase 'including, but not limited to,' arguing that phrase suggests the Legislature intended there be no limitation on consequential damages. However, her interpretation would make the phrase 'actually incurred,' surplusage, a construction to be avoided. It is presumed every provision of the statute performs a useful function and in this case a reasonable construction to avoid surplusage is that 'rental car costs actually incurred' is only one category of incidental or consequential damages. However, in the specific category of 'rental car costs,' the Legislature has placed a limiting term, one which is undeniably logical and would not otherwise have been recoverable under a contract theory of damages (except perhaps in a commercial context under the concept of 'cover'). The limitation is consistent with all other statutory provisions and authorities referring to breach of contract damages in that it permits a buyer to recover monetary losses, but not be 'compensated' for 'losses' resulting in no monetary deprivation. "We are not free to ignore the Legislature's unambiguous indication of intent and supplement the Act's statutory remedies with additional ones drawn from the law of torts. . . ." (Id. at pp. 757-758.)