Blanton v. Womancare, Inc

In Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, the plaintiff's attorney signed a stipulation for binding arbitration without the plaintiff's consent and "contrary to her express instructions." (Id., at p. 403.) "When apprised that her attorney had submitted her dispute to binding arbitration, plaintiff immediately objected, and fired her attorney. She then hired new counsel, and through him moved to invalidate the stipulation to binding arbitration executed by her former attorney . . . ." (Id., at p. 400.) Our Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff was not bound by counsel's stipulation. The court observed that, although the plaintiff may have been bound by counsel's stipulation if she had ratified it, no such ratification had occurred: "While unauthorized acts of an attorney may be binding upon his client through ratification citation, no ratification appears here. Immediately upon learning of the arbitration agreement plaintiff fired her attorney and engaged new counsel to set it aside." (Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 408.) In Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., the California Supreme Court was faced with deciding whether the client was bound by her attorney's signature. Blanton's attorney also stipulated to binding arbitration. The effect was no further judicial review of the case. Blanton had not given her oral consent to the stipulation. As soon as Blanton learned about it, she objected and fired her attorney. The Supreme Court noted it is "accepted practice within the legal profession . . . for attorneys to rely upon representations made by other attorneys with respect to the scope of their authority." ( Id. at p. 406.) However, it concluded the attorney there lacked the apparent authority to waive the client's substantial rights by entering into binding arbitration without the client's consent. The Supreme Court also observed, " 'Absent express authority, it is established that an attorney does not have implied plenary authority to enter into contracts on behalf of his client.'" ( Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., supra, 38 Cal. 3d at p. 407.)