In BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, a city council denied a CUP to an applicant that sought to change the nature of its business from a youth-oriented billiard parlor to a much larger, adult-oriented facility which would sell alcoholic beverages. (Id. at pp. 1219-1220, 1248.) The trial court denied the applicant's petition for writ of mandate. (Id. at p. 1220.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding substantial evidence to support the decision of the city council. (Id. at pp. 1244-1248.) In BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance (2000) plaintiff contended that campaign contributions from his lessor, who had an interest in disapproval of his permit application, triggered a section 1090 violation. The reviewing court disagreed, emphasizing the conflict of interest doctrine requires that the public officer have some interest in the outcome, whether direct or indirect. ( Id. at p. 1230.) The City contends that Skane and Mailhot never claimed Stallings had an interest in the outcome of a contract or even in her votes. Again, it proffers a myopic interpretation of the scope of section 1090 while misreading the precedent. The BreakZone court recognized that while an interest in the outcome need not be a present interest but may arise after the taking of the governmental action, the record was devoid of any factual allegations invoking the indirect interest rule. The court explained that it is not sufficient that a public officer desires to advocate the position of a campaign supporter. "There must be some financial or pecuniary benefit to the governmental official which could sway his or her judgment." ( Id. at p. 1231.) Further, the court emphasized that the record did not contain any facts from which it could conclude that any of the recipients of campaign contributions would derive any personal benefit from a vote to overturn the determination of the planning commission or demonstrate that a vote against the application would benefit the contributor. (Ibid.) The court contrasted the facts of its case with those involving a campaign contribution made in return for an express promise to exercise governmental authority in a particular way regarding a specific pending or imminent matter or a reward for an earlier governmental action, finding neither factual circumstance were suggested there. ( Id. at p. 1233.) In BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance, the Torrance City Planning Commission approved a project to convert a previously youth-oriented pool parlor to an adult-oriented establishment able to sell alcohol. The city's police department, however, perceived trouble in the application, noting that even as a youth-oriented pool hall, BreakZone was a "gathering spot for gang members" and recommended against the application. (BreakZone, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1209, 1213.) A city council member filed an appeal from the decision using the city's standard appeal form, saying he was appealing " 'based on Police Department recommendation' " in order to "bring the matter in front of the entire Council." (Id. at pp. 1213, 1214.) The city council then granted the appeal, and denied the application. (Id. at pp. 1219-1220.) The trial court denied the ensuing petition for writ of mandate and the appellate court affirmed. But BreakZone's main focus on the issue of the possible bias of the city council member who filed the appeal was on whether the mere fact the council member had filed an appeal was itself enough to show an unacceptable probability of actual bias. (BreakZone, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235 framing issue as whether "the fact that one council member filed the appeal and participated in and voted on that appeal is a violation of the common law of conflict of interest and requires issuance of a writ of mandate".) After first framing the issue in terms of whether the fact the council member had filed the appeal was enough by itself to show a violation of due process, the BreakZone court spent some considerable space knocking down the applicant's reliance on Withrow v. Larkin (1975) 421 U.S. 35, a federal Supreme Court professional discipline due process case involving a doctor's license. The point of that discussion was to try to establish that for a due process violation in an adjudicatory context to occur, there must be a "commitment to a result"--though the BreakZone court allowed that "even a tentative commitment" might do. (BreakZone, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.) But, having made that concession, the BreakZone court added that "advance knowledge of adjudicative facts that are in dispute, as well as participation in the charging function" is not enough, alone, to show a due process violation. (Ibid.) The BreakZone court emphasized that fact again several times: "We thus are confronted with the question left unanswered in Cohan: If an individual member of a city council follows a procedure set out in a properly drawn ordinance, is he or she disqualified from participating in the subsequent hearing and voting on the matter?" (BreakZone, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1240, some italics added.) BreakZone was thus based upon a city code that expressly allowed appeal by a city council member. In sum, the court found that council members who had received campaign contributions ranging from $ 100 to $ 5,500 more than 17 months before a vote did not have a prohibited financial interest under section 1090 because there was no evidence the members received a personal benefit that swayed their judgment. (BreakZone Billiards, at p. 1231.) In considering whether there was a common law conflict of interest violation, the court noted in dicta: "We contrast the facts of this case with one in which it is alleged the campaign contribution is made in return for an express promise to act in a particular way in exercising governmental authority with respect to a particular matter then pending or which may be presented for governmental review and action at a later date. ... We do not foreclose a circumstance in which an earlier governmental action is 'rewarded' in an illegal manner ... ." (Id. at p. 1233.) While this prescient dictum is addressed to a hypothetical "express promise" the decision did not foreclose the adequacy of proof by circumstantial evidence as sufficient to render a contract void under section 1090.